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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Consolidated NO.950696-CA 
v, : 
BRENT JACKSON, RAQUEL NIBL£SN, : Priority No. 2 
AND PATRICIA E. SMITH, 
Defendants-Appellants : 
JURISDICTION AMP NATURE OF FRQCBBPiygg 
Defendants appeal from their guilty pleas to unlawful 
possession or use of marijuana in a drug free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) 
(1996), and unlawful possession or use of drug paraphernalia in a 
drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1996), which pleas were conditioned upon the 
right to challenge on appeal the denial of their motion to 
suppress evidence. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the police seizure and inspection of defendants' 
curbside trash, which was clearly proper under the United States 
Constitution, nevertheless violate the Utah Constitution? 
Whether there is a state constitutional interest in trash left 
outside the curtilage of a home is a question of law, reviewed de 
novo by this Court. State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 
1996) (citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
2. Did the trial court properly deny defendants' motion to 
suppress on the basis that the search warrant was supported by 
probable cause and issued in good faith? In reviewing a denial 
of a motion to suppress a search warrant, the appellate court 
does not review the magistrate's determination of probable cause 
de novo but "simply decide[s] if the 'magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding that there were enough facts 
within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed.'" State 
v. Viah, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994) (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Const. Art. 1, Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
2 
STATEMENT OF TCS CASS 
Defendants, Brent Jackson, Patricia E. Smith, and Raquel 
Nielsen, were charged with various drug-related felony and class 
A misdemeanor offenses in connection with the search of their 
home on June 8, 1994 (JR. 6-8; SR. 28-30; NR. 10-12).* 
Defendants jointly moved to suppress the evidence from the 
search which motion was denied (JR. 88-104; SR. 97-113; NR. 92-
107). See addendum C for copy of Court's Ruling. Defendants 
then entered conditional guilty pleas to unlawful possession or 
use of marijuana and unlawful possession or use of drug 
paraphernalia, both in a drug free zones, class A misdemeanors 
(JR. 110-21; SR. 119-30; NR. 113-24), with each reserving the 
right to challenge the trial court's ruling (JR. 124-27; SR. 127-
30; NR. 127-30). On October 10, 1995, defendants were sentenced 
on each count to one year in jail and a $2500 fine, both 
suspended upon 36 months probation (JR. 128-30; SR. 138-39; NR. 
127-30). 
Defendants separately appealed (JR. 136; SR. 145; NR. 139). 
This Court consolidated the appeals. 
1
 JR refers to the Jackson record; SR to the Smith record; and NR to the Nielsen record. 
These records were consolidated for purposes of appeal but are separately paginated. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants Jackson and Smith maintain a common-law marriage 
and live in Provo, Utah, with defendant Nielsen, who is Smiths' 
adult daughter by a prior relationship. See Presentence Report 
in Jackson Record. 
In April 1994, several men broke into defendants' home and 
demanded drugs and money. The men removed marijuana and cocaine 
from the home (JR. 82-83; SR. 91-92/ NR. 85-86). After reporting 
the incident to the police, defendants were granted immunity from 
prosecution for any crime related to the April incident id.: 
JR.22-24; SR. 16-18; NR. 13-15). 
Early in the morning on June 8, 1994, police officers went 
to defendants' home and observed two garbage cans with 
defendants' house number stenciled on the sides sitting in the 
street in front of the home. The officers took the cans to the 
police station where they searched through the trash, finding 
marijuana stems and seeds, a marijuana cigarette, a small amount 
of marijuana indicative of personal use, and Zig-zag papers (JR. 
27-29, 82-83; SR. 7-8, 91-92; NR. 18-20, 85-86). See addendum B 
for copy of Search Affidavit and Warrant. The police returned 
the garbage cans to their location in front of defendants' home 
for regular garbage pickup (id.). 
4 
Based on the results of their inspection of the trash, the 
police secured and executed a search warrant for defendants' home 
the same day (JR. 25-26, SR. 5-6 & 10, NR. 16-17). Drugs and 
drug paraphernalia were found in the home (SR.10). 
SUMMARY QF AfrgPMgNT 
The warrantless seizure and inspection of defendants' trash, 
left in garbage cans outside the curtilage of their home for 
garbage collection, does not implicct^ a constitutional interest. 
The United States Supreme Court, all federal district courts, and 
the majority of state courts which have considered the issue have 
concluded that society does not recognize an expectation of 
privacy in garbage. While a handful of state courts have reached 
a contrary conclusion based on interpretations of their state 
constitutions, defendants have provided no historical, 
contextual, or policy reason to find such a privacy interest 
here. 
The subsequent search warrant was supported by probable 
cause. The affidavit was based on relevant, recent, and truthful 
information which, when viewed in its entirety, constituted a 
sufficient basis to believe that drugs would be located in 
de f endant s' home. 
5 
Even if this Court were to conclude that the warrant was 
deficient, the trial court's finding of good faith defeats 
defendants' argument that the evidence should be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants first challenge the search warrant as defective, 
claiming that the affidavit in support of the warrant lacked 
probable cause. They contend that if several paragraphs of the 
affidavit are deleted as irrelevant, the remaining paragraphs are 
insufficient to support the search because (1) any evidence found 
in the prior inspection of defendants' trash did not establish a 
present basis to believe that drugs were in the home, and (2) the 
inclusion of Jackson's and Smith's prior drug dealings was 
improper since defendants had been granted immunity from the 
April 1994 crimes, and this bad act as well as a 1993 crime were 
too remote in time to be relevant (Brief of Appellant [Br. App.], 
Point I). Next, they argue that no information from the seizure 
and inspection of their trash should have been included in the 
warrant because they have a state constitutional interest in 
their garbage which precludes a warrantless police invasion (Br. 
App., Point II). Defendants also assert that when the challenged 
information is deleted, the affidavit so lacks probable cause as 
6 
to preclude any finding that it was issued in good faith (Br. 
App. at 15-16 & 36-38). 
Since the evidence found in defendants' garbage cans largely 
formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant, no 
determination of the sufficiency of the warrant may be made 
without first determining the propriety of the warrantless trash 
seizure and inspection. If, as defendants contend, the 
warrantless police action violated a state constitutional 
interest, deleting that evidence from the affidavit would indeed 
undermine the finding of probable cause. At that point, the only 
issue would be whether the officers' good faith reliance on 
existing law excused the deficiency. For these reasons, the 
State will address the points raised by defendants in reverse 
order. 
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POINT I 
TRASH LEFT FOR GARBAGE PICK-UP OUTSIDE THE CURTILAGE OF 
A HOME IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED UNDER THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
1. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Recognize a 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Trash and Garbage. 
Defendants concede that under the Fourth Amendment, there is 
no constitutional expectation of privacy in trash left outside 
the curtilage of a home. California V. SreenWPQfl, 486 U.S. 35, 
39-41, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628-29 (1988). 
The facts in Greenwood are nearly identical to those before 
this Court. Greenwood, a narcotics trafficker, placed 
incriminating items in opaque plastic bags and then left the bags 
on his curb for regular garbage collection. Id. at 37 & 1627. 
The police asked a garbage collector to bring them the bags after 
he collected them but before they were commingled with any other 
garbage. Id. When the collector did, the police inspected the 
trash and, based on the discovery of incriminating items, secured 
a search warrant for Greenwood's home. The search warrant was 
executed and more drugs were found. Id. at 38 & 1627, 
In reversing the state court's suppression of the evidence, 
the United States Supreme Court assumed that Greenwood had a 
subjective expectation that his trash would not be searched by 
8 
the police, but concluded that such an expectation was not 
objectively reasonable, a critical requirement for constitutional 
protection-2 Id. at 40-41, 1628-29. Because Greenwood placed 
the trash at the curb, a place "readily accessible to animals, 
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public," 
id.. he had "deposited [his] garbage %in an area particularly 
suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public 
consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take 
it,' [and therefore he had] no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the inculpatory items that [he] discarded." Id. at 40-41, 
1629 (citation omitted)• Since there was no constitutional 
interest in the trash, the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment was inapplicable. Id. at 41-43, 1629-30. 
Even before Greenwood, a majority of jurisdictions had 
reached the same conclusion. As the Supreme Court noted, its 
determination "that society would not accept as reasonable [the] 
claim to an expectation of privacy in trash left for collection 
2
 "An expectation of privacy is a question of intent, which 'may be inferred from words 
spoken, acts done, and other objective facts."' State v. Matison. 875 P.2d 584,587-88 (Utah 
App. 1994) (citations omitted). Only when such a personal expectation coincides with a 
"societal understanding that [the place or object] deservesfs] the most scrupulous protection from 
governmental invasion," is the expectation "legitimate." Greenwood. 486 U.S. at 43,108 S. Ct. 
at 1630. S£S al§Q Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128,143,99 S. Ct. 421,430 (1978); Katzv. 
United States. 389 U.S. 347, 351-53, 88 S. Ct 507, 511-12 (1967) (establishing analytical 
framework for determining when police action involves a constitutional interest). 
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in an area accessible to the public is reinforced by the 
unanimous rejection of similar claims by the Federal Courts of 
Appeals." Id. at 41-42, 1629 (citing pre-existing decisions from 
the first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, 
and eleventh circuit courts of appeals). Similarly, the majority 
of state courts which had considered the issue prior to Greenwood 
had "held that the police may conduct warrantless searches and 
seizures of garbage discarded in public areas." Id. at 42-43, 
1630 (citing decisions from Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). See discussion of 
specific cases infra at 19-21. 
Greenwood recognized that while the Fourth Amendment affords 
no constitutional protection to discarded trash, states are free 
to interpret the scope of their own constitutional search and 
seizure provisions. Id. at 43 & 1630. Indeed, at the time of 
Greenwood, Hawaii and California had done so. Today, four states 
recognize a constitutional interest in trash under independent 
readings of their state constitutions: these are Hawaii, New 
10 
Jersey, .crmont and Washington.3 See discussion of specific 
cases infra at 23-27. 
Such deviations from federal law are not simply a matter of 
separate state procedural standing; rather, they determine if a 
state constitutional interest exists.4 In this context, the 
issue here is whether, under the Utah Constitution, there is a 
protectible constitutional interest in trash or garbage left 
outside the curtilage of a home such that police must have 
probable cause to seize, inspect or otherwise search it? 
2. A Result Different than the Federal Standard is 
not Warranted Under the Utah Constitution. 
The federal constitution provides the minimum guarantee of 
protections and rights; a state constitution may or may not 
expand these. Sims v. State Tax Com'n. 841 P.2d 6, 10 n.9 (Utah 
3
 Drfendant cites California and Indiana as recognizing a state constitutional privacy 
interest. However, Moran v. State. 625 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. App. 1993), was reversed by Moran 
v. State. 644 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 1994). Similarly, People v. Krivda. 486 P.2d 1262 (Calif. 1971) 
has been effectively nullified by subsequent amendment of the California Constitution. 
Greenwood. 486 U.S. at 38-39,108 S. Ct at 1628. 
Defendant did not cite the recent decision of the Vermont Supreme Court recognizing a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in trash on the basis that trash, like a search of a bedroom, can 
reveal intimate details about a person's sexual practices, health and personal hygiene. Sss State 
v. Morris. 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996). 
4
 The common interchange of the term "standing" for "expectation of privacy" is 
misleading. "Standing" involves justiciability and jurisdiction. Provo Citv Corp. v. Wilden. 768 
P.2d 455,457 (Utah 1989). "Expectation of privacy" determines if there is a constitutional 
question to resolve. State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415,416 n.2 (Utah 1991) . 
11 
1992). But the fact that a state may create more expansive 
rights, does not compel the conclusion that it has. State v. 
Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1235, 1239 & 1241 (Utah 1996) 
(disagreeing on analytical approach but concurring in result that 
automobile exception is the same under state and federal 
constitutions). To guard against "result-oriented and therefore 
unprincipled" state constitutional interpretation,5 the Utah 
Supreme Court has articulated narrow criteria for departing from 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. However, these criteria do not 
fully determine the court's discretion to depart from federal 
standards. Compare State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 & n.8 
(Utah 1988), with Anderson. 910 P.2d at 1242 (Durham, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (Watts was not "intended to indicate 
that inconsistency and confusion in federal constitutional 
analysis are the only reasons we undertake independent state 
constitutional analysis."). 
Applying the Watts criteria, Utah courts have given article 
I, section 14 a more expansive interpretation only when federal 
5
 See Christine M. Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in Utah Courts. 2 Utah 
B.J., Nov. 1989 at 26. See sisfi State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 531,536 (Utah 1994) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (it is " inappropriate for this Court to use Article I, Section 14, the Utah unreasonable 
search and seizure provision, to attempt to 'fine tune' federal constitutional search and seizure 
law"; disagreement with a particular federal search and seizure opinion "does not justify 
resorting to Article I, Section 14 to achieve a different result"). 
12 
analysis of the challenged police action was plagued with 
inconsistency and/or confusion. Compare State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 
141, 149 (Utah App. 1991), pet. for cert, dismissed as 
improvidently granted, 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994) (relying on state 
provisions to clarify confusion cause by federal case law), with 
Sims v. State Tax Com'n. 841 P.2d at 15 (Stewart, J., concurring 
in result) (conclusion that Sims' roadblock was illegal under 
Utah Constitution is "dictum" since third justice found it 
illegal under only the federal standard). Compare also State v. 
Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 466 (Utah 1990) (plurality concluding that 
opening of car door to inspect vehicle identification constituted 
a search under the state constitution), with Anderson. 910 P.2d 
at 1235 & 1239 (federal and state automobile warrant exception 
are identical after post-Larocco United States Supreme Court 
decision "cured any confusion"). 
Defendant relies extensively on State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 
415 (Utah 1991), the only case in which a majority of the supreme 
court agreed on an independent interpretation of article 1, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution. In Thompson. 810 P.2d at 
418, the Utah Supreme Court held that under the Utah 
Constitution, individuals have a constitutional interest in their 
bank records requiring probable cause before the records may be 
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seized. The court found that federal law governing the seizure 
of bank records was confused as a result of the much criticized 
decision in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)(holding 
that a depositor had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his 
bank records), which conflicted with the more widely-followed 
generalized expectation of privacy test enunciated in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511 (1967) 
(recognizing what a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in 
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected"). Thompson. 810 P.2d at 417. The Utah Supreme Court 
joined several other states that had already rejected Miller in 
favor of Katz by concluding that *[s]ince it is virtually 
impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary 
society without maintaining an account with a bank, opening a 
bank account is not entirely volitional and should not be seen as 
conduct which constitutes a waiver of an expectation of privacy." 
Thompson. 810 P.2d at 418 (quotation and citations omitted). 
Because depositors reasonably assume that information supplied to 
a bank is confidential, the Utah Supreme Court held that under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, defendants had 
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"standing" to challenge the search and seizure of their bank 
records.6 Id. at 418. 
Despite the limited nature of the Thompson ruling, 
defendants extrapolate that independent state interpretation is 
mandated for all expectation of privacy issues due to the 
"societal and historical context of the Utah Constitution," the 
"primacy model," and, in this case, a limited number of non-
contxoiling decisions from other states. Defendants are 
mistaken. 
(A) Utah's History Does Not Suggest that 
Mormons or Polygamists Had a Greater Interest 
in Their Garbage Than Other Societies. 
Defendants argue that because Utah was settled by Mormons, 
many of whom were subjected to prosecution for their polygamous 
practices, framers of the Utah Constitution must have intended 
greater protection of their citizen's "personal effects" than 
under federal law. Without further analysis, defendants then 
conclude that this greater protection must necessarily extend to 
discarded trash. (Br. App. at 21-26). This conclusion is without 
support. 
6
 Thompson's over-inclusive use of the term "standing" is understandable in light of the 
issue. £fi£ discussion, supra at 11 n.4. The records sought were not in Thompson's possession 
but reflected Thompson's interactions with the bank. 
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Had the framers of Utah's constitution been dissatisfied 
with the scope of protection provided by the Fourth Amendment, 
they would presumably have drafted a textually different search 
and seizure provision, rather than adopting language that is 
nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the 
development of Utah's search and seizure provision prior to the 
adoption of article I, section 14 reflects a steady movement by 
the framers toward adoption of the precise wording of the Fourth 
Amendment. See addendum A for textual history of article I, 
section 14. With each progressive revision of Utah's search and 
seizure provision, its language became more similar to that of 
the Fourth Amendment. While the original 1849 version 
significantly differed from its federal counterpart, that 
difference was abandoned in 1872 in favor of language very 
similar to that of the Fourth Amendment. This path of growing 
similarity continued until 1895, when the present provision, 
essentially identical to the federal, was adopted.7 
Even in those cases where article I, section 14 has been 
construed differently than the Fourth Amendment, the distinction 
7
 In contrast, the framers were not hesitate to adopt dissimilar language in other portions 
of the constitution when it was clear that they wished to depart from the federal standard. Sep 
Society of Separationists v. Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993) (explaining historical 
development of Utah Const, art. I ,§§1& 4). 
16 
has not beer based on historical criteria. Instead, Utah courts 
have implicitly recognized that there is nothing in Utah's 
history, and especially the history of article I, section 14, 
that justifies departing from federal search and seizure 
standards. Rather than relying on the historical context, Utah 
courts have departed from federal search and seizure standards 
only in the limited circumstances articulated in Watts. See 
Thompson. 810 P.2d at 418 (poorly reasoned, conflicting, and 
confusing federal precedent governing expectation of privacy in 
bank records justified independent analysis); Sims. 808 P.2d at 
149 (confusing federal precedent and existing state statutory law 
compelled result); Larocco. 794 P.2d at 469 (confusing and 
inconsistent approaches taken regarding car searches justified 
differing result) (plurality opinion). 
(B) Neither Policy Nor Confusion in the Law 
Governing Police Seizure/Inspection of Trash 
Justify a Departure from Federal Standards. 
Defendants assert that under the "primacy model," state 
courts must necessarily look to their own constitutions before 
considering federal interpretation (Br. App. at 26-29). While 
discussed, the primacy approach has not been utilized by Utah 
courts except in instances where the state constitutional 
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provision predates its federal counterpart or the language of the 
state provision is unique.8 
While our supreme court justices have differed on what 
analytical approach should apply, £££, e.g.. Anderson. 910 P.2d 
1229, the justices have concurred on the ultimate policy to be 
reached. In Larocco. members of the court were concerned with 
creating a more workable rule for police and trial courts than 
the then-ambiguously defined federal standard. Similarly, in 
Thompson, the court rejected an analytically flawed federal 
decision in favor of the traditional concept of privacy reflected 
by the realities of modern life. Without such clear statements 
of the policy bases for any new state rule, trial courts and law 
enforcement would be left without guidance on the rule's 
application. Cf. Anderson. 910 P.2d at 1239 (Zimmerman, C.J., 
concurring in result). 
Here, defendants' analysis under the primacy approach is no 
more than a recognition that such an approach exists. As such, 
8
 Compare. SLgx generalized discussion of appropriate analytical model in Anderson. 910 
P.2d at 1239-42 (Zimmerman, C.J., Stewart, J., and Durham, J., separate concurring opinions), 
SflJh actual analysis applied in ThQpipgQq, 810 P.2d at 416-18, and Larocco. 794 P.2d at 465-71, 
and with analysis applied in Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661,670 (Utah 1984) (comparing Utah's 
uniform operation of laws provision with federal equal protection provision); Society of 
Separationists. 870 P.2d at 930 (analyzing state establishment of religion provision); and 
American Fork Citv v. Crosgrove. 701 P.2d 1069,1071-72 (Utah 1985) (interpreting scope of 
right against self-incrimination found in article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution). 
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it is deficient. &££. State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640, 645 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993)(merely relying 
"upon general statements that Utah has a unique history and that 
in some cases, other states have interpreted their constitutions 
to provide broader protections that the United States 
Constitution" does not provide a sufficient reason for an 
independent rule). But defendants failure is two-fold, for they 
also fail to advance any practical or theoretical reason for more 
broadly construing article 1, section 14. In the context of 
trash, none exists. 
The majority view that discarded trash is not 
constitutionally protected rests on several rationales. Some 
courts based their analysis on principles of abandonment: the 
very term "garbage" necessarily implies that the owner has 
discarded and relinquished any interest in the item. See, e.g.. 
United States v. Kramer. 711 F.2d 789, 792 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied/ 464 U.S. 962 (1983); Commonwealth v. Perdue. 564 A.2d 
489, 492-93 (Pa. Super. 1989), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 68 (Pa 
1990). Others have applied an "assumption of risk" theory. See, 
e.g.. State v, Stevens, 367 N.W.2d 788, 795 (Wis.), cert, denied. 
474 U.S. 852 (1985)("the risk of a police search of garbage is 
assumed in the routine disposal of garbage by municipal 
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employees") . Still others consider whether the police ''trespass' 
to seize the garbage a critical factor. See State v. Krech. 403 
N.W.2d 634, 636 (Minn. 1987) (accepting that property left for 
collection is "abandoned" but viewing the "real issue" as 
"whether the police violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights 
in going onto the land in order to seize the abandoned 
property"). But Compare United States v. Hedrick.. 922 F.2d 396, 
398-400 (7th Cir.), cert denied. 502 U.S. 847 (1991)(garbage 
within curtilage of home but readily viewable by the public is 
"knowingly exposed" to the public for Fourth Amendment purposes 
and may be seized by the police). 
By far the mostly widely adopted rationale is that found in 
Greenwood: accessibility by the public. 486 U.S. at 40-41, 108 
S. Ct. at 1628-29. Typical is People v. Hillman. 834 P.2d 1271, 
1277 (Colo. 1992) in which the Colorado Supreme Court held that 
reality dedicated that "individuals do not have reasonable 
expectations of privacy when their garbage is readily accessible 
to members of the public."9 The court stated: 
9
 At the same time, the court noted that "there may be circumstances in which a resident 
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage bags that are so positioned within the 
curtilage of a residence as to not be readily accessible to the public. In so finding, however, we 
do not premise our holding on theories of abandonment of interests in property or assumption of 
risk." Hillman. 834 P.2d at 1277 n.17. 
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"The obvious distinction between garbage cans and other 
containers is that it is 'common knowledge' that 
members of the public often sort through other people's 
garbage, and that the garbage is eventually removed by 
garbage collectors on a regular basis." 
Id. at 1275 (quoting Hedrick. 922 F,2d at 399 (citing Greenwood. 
486 U.S. at 40, 108 S. Ct. at 1629)). See also State v. Texel. 
433 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Neb. 1989) ("no reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists in garbage which has been made accessible to the 
public"); People v. Collins. 478 N.E.2d 267, 279 (111. 1985), 
cert, denied. 474 U.S. 935 (1985)(police search of garbage "was 
no more intrusive than what the defendant might have expected 
from passing tenants, vagrants, neighborhood children, or 
animals").10 
The federal and majority approach is reasonable. Unlike 
financial information which is generally viewed as confidential 
and personal, Thompson. 810 P.2d at 4:: 5, the modern realities of 
trash are that vagrants and scavengers commonly invade garbage 
containers--at whatever location--to find food and other items of 
value. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 n.3, ICi S. Ct. at 1629 n.3. 
£££ alSfi Lars Eigher, Travels with Lizbeth: Three Years on the 
10
 Other post-Greenwood r.Ats cases finding no expectation of privacy in trash include 
State v. Fisher. 591 So.2d 1049 (Fla. App. 1991); Perkins v. State. 398 S.E.2d 702 (Ga. App. 
1990); Walls v. State. 536 So.2d 137 (Ala. App. 1988); and State v. Henderson. 435 N.W.2d 394 
(Iowa App. 1988), cert, denied. 490 U.S. 1020 (1989). This list is by no means exhaustive. 
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Road and on the Streets, at 111-25 (1993) (explaining the 
lifestyle of Mumpster diving") (copy attached in addendum D). 
Moreover, unlike economic transactions which realistically 
require some bank involvement, Thompson. 810 P.2d at 418, there 
are many ways for an individual to dispose of unwanted items. 
They can burn them, shred them, mutilate identifying information, 
or leave the incriminating items at remote locations. Neat 
disposal of the evidence of crime in city-approved trash 
containers in front of one's home is only one of many options. 
Most importantly, acceptance of defendants' argument would 
result in an overly broad, unworkable rule. Defendants assert 
that their trash is constitutionally protected, no matter what 
its location, until it is commingled with other garbage and loses 
its identity (Br. App. at 29-36, relying on state constitutional 
decisions). This would create an artificial dual standard. From 
the moment the trash is placed for collection at defendants' 
curb, garbage collectors and other strangers would have access to 
it. After collection, all control over the trash transfers from 
defendants to strangers, who have no realistic restrictions on 
either their physical access or use of the garbage. Yet, under 
defendants' theory, the police would still be precluded from 
receiving, viewing, or otherwise examining the discarded items. 
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Only . r the point that defendants' trash is physically 
wcommingled" with other trash, thereby losing its identity, would 
the police obtain the same ^rights" as the strangers. Such a 
result curtails police action even while the general public has 
full access to the "private" trash. This result is unreasonable. 
£L~ State Vt Belgard, 840 P.2d 819, 823 (Utah App. 1992) (**For 
an officer to look at what is in open viev ~~om a position 
lawfully accessible to the public cannot constitute an invasion 
of a reasonable expectation of privacy'," quoting State v. Lee. 
633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981)). 
The consistent, clear, and reasonable approach taken by 
federal courts and the majority of jurisdictions should be 
followed here: trash placed for garbage collection is not 
constitutionally protected from police inspection and seizure. 
(C) Non-Controlling Case Law from Other 
Jurisdictions Does Not Justify a Different 
Result. 
Four states currently recognize a state constitutional 
interer ^n trash. See supra at 10-11 & n.3. None are 
persuas ve. 
State V. Tanaka, 701 P-2d 1274 (Haw. 1985), is a pre-
Greenwood decision. With little discussion and no analysis, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that because state precedent 
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recognized an expectation of privacy in objects placed in closed 
containers, trash in opaque plastic garbage bags would also 
necessarily be protected. Tanaka. 701 P.2d at 1275-76. Notably, 
the trash bags in question were not placed for collection at the 
time they were searched; instead, the police "trespassed onto 
private property." Id. at 1275. Defendants ignore this factual 
distinction but the trial court did not. See addendum, Ruling at 
95-96. The trial court saw significance in both the trespass and 
Hawaii's constitution's unique provision requiring a compelling 
state interest to override a citizen's right to privacy.11 Id. 
at 95. 
Similarly, in State v. Boland. 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash 1990), 
the police observed Boland take his garbage can to the curb for 
collection and secure the lid by placing a heavy piece of wood on 
it. The police emptied the trash can and examined the contents 
at the police station. Based on the incriminating items found, 
the police obtained a search warrant for the home. Boland, 800 
11
 Tanaka involved three separate searches. The trial court in this case noted that in two 
of the cases, the intrusions were trespasses but believed that in the third case, the trash was 
outside the curtilage. See addendum C Ruling at 96. This is incorrect. The Tanaka opinion 
stated that the police "entered defendants' property," 701 P.2d at 1276, noting that if it were to 
hold other than it did, "police could search everyone's trash bags on their property without any 
reason and thereby learn of their activities, associations, and beliefs." IJL at 1277 (emphasis 
added). 
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P.2d at 1113. The Washington Supreme Court concluded that since 
local ordinances required Boland to place his garbage can in the 
street and another ordinance made it unlawful for anyone to 
remove the contents without authorization, Boland reasonably 
expected the trash to be protected from police intrusion. Id. at 
1114-15. Further, since the Washington Constitution protects the 
"private affairs" of its citizenry, trash, which can reveal 
"private affairs," is constitutionally protected whatever its 
location Id. at 1115-17. This broad interpretation of the 
Washington Constitution has not been limited to trash: Washington 
recognizes a privacy interest in jail property boxes, locked 
trunks of impounded vehicles, and locked containers in searched 
vehicles; it also precludes the warrantless installation of pen 
registers, despite United States Supreme Court decisions to the 
contrary. Id. at 1115 & 1117. Like Tanaka. the uniqueness of 
the Washington constitutional provision distinguishes this case 
from the present one.12 See addendum C, Ruling at 94. 
On the other hand, State v. Hempele. 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 
12
 Boland has bee^ applied in a limited manner in Washington. In State v. Rodriguez, 
828 P.2d 636,642 (Wa^h,. rev, denied, 838 P.2d 692 (Wash. 1992), the court refused to find a 
privacy interest in tram placed in a bag thrown on top of an apartment community dumpster. 
The court distinguished Boland by finding that the trash was "not garbage ordinarily 
accumulated in a household, but rather is stolen property defendant is apparently attempting to 
hide." LI 
25 
1990) is indistinguishable from this case. See addendum C, 
Ruling at 93-94, 97, Hempele placed controlled substances in a 
plastic trash bag which he then placed in his garbage can in 
front of his home. Hempele. 576 A.2d at 796. In interpreting 
its constitutional search and seizure provision, a provision 
similar to Utah's, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the 
Katz-Rakas two-prong test for expectation of privacy, asking 
instead whether nit is reasonable for a person to want to keep 
the contents of his or her garbage private." ;rd. at 801-02 
(emphasis in original). Comparing the action of leaving a 
garbage bag on the street to leaving a letter in a mailbox for 
pickup, id. at 805, the court concluded that *[g]iven the secrets 
that refuse can disclose, it is reasonable for a person to prefer 
that his or her garbage remain private," Id. at 803. The 
weaknesses of the court's analysis can best be seen by its 
inaccurate conclusion that the contents of a letter left in a 
mailbox is as *%readily accessible' to snoops and others" as 
trash, id. at 805, and its observation that, while it was unsure 
if garbage collectors had the legal right to examine trash or 
consent to a police search, the collector's rights should be 
construed similarly to a "landlord's." Id. at 805-06. 
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The convoluted reasoning of Hempele was not followed by the 
Indiana Court in Moran v. State. 625 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. App. 
1993), reversed by Moran v. State. 644 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 1994). 
The original Moran decision, cited by defendant and relied upon 
by the trial court, simply adopted the reasoning of the Greenwood 
dissent, concluding that garbage was constitutionally protected 
under the Indiana Constitution. The court reasoned that it made 
no difference if the trash was on a defendant's property or left 
at curbside; in either case, placing the trash outside for the 
"sole purpose of having the trash collector take it and mingle it 
with the trash of thousand of other citizens is to manifest an 
expectation that it will remain secure and private, at a minimum, 
until removed by the trash collector." Moran. 625 N.E.2d at 
123 9. As the trial court recognized, Moran fully supports 
defendants' argument, but constitutes a limited exception to the 
overwhelming majority view that no such constitutional interest 
exists, fias. addendum C, Ruling at 93-94. However, defendant 
failed to acknowledge below or now on appeal that Moran's state 
constitutional holding has been reversed by the Indiana Supreme 
Court. fi££ Moran v. State. 644 N.E.2d at 539-541. Indiana has 
now fully adopted the Greenwood standard and does not recognize a 
constitutional interest in curbside trash. Id. 
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In sum, the handful of cases which have found an 
expectation of privacy in trash have either based their decisions 
on the unique language of their state constitutions, are 
supported by poor reasoning, or have been rejected by their own 
superior court. They provide no policy, legal, or factual 
rationales that have not been considered and rejected by the 
majority of state and federal courts. Without a legitimate basis 
to extend state constitutional protection, this Court should 
reject defendants' arguments that they have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in trash left for collection. 
3. Even If This Court Were to Find A State 
Constitutional Interest in Discarded Trash, the 
Officers in this Case Acted Reasonably and in Good 
Faith. 
Interestingly, after concluding that a constitutionally 
protected interest in trash existed, the Indiana Court of Appeals 
in Moran concluded that their holding did not invalidate the 
search: 
At the time when the warrant was issued, however, no 
Indiana court had ruled on the issue of warrantless 
searches of curbside trash. Therefore, it was 
reasonable for the officers to determine the legality 
of the warrantless search by reliance on Greenwood. 
Moran. 625 N.E.2d at 1241, reversed on other grounds, 644 N.E.2d 
536. Accord United States v. Thorton. 746 F.2d 39, 49 (D.C. Cir. 
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1984) (concluding based on pre-Greenwood law that it was 
"eminently reasonable" for the officers to believe that a trash 
search was constitutional). 
In this case, the trial court adopted similar reasoning and 
found, in the alternative, that even if a state constitutional 
interest did exist, the court would uphold the validity of the 
search of the home on the basis of the good faith exception. See 
addendum C, Ruling at 90. 
Defendants attack this ruling by encouraging this Court to 
do what has not been done in any other Utah case, wto decide 
whether there is a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." Thompson. 
810 P.2d at 419. Defendants acknowledge that if there is no 
expectation of privacy in trash, there is no reason to reach this 
issue (Br. App. at 36) .13 
"The 'prime purpose' of the [federal] exclusionary rule, if 
not the sole one, %is to deter future unlawful police conduct.'" 
State v. Ziealman, 905 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting 
United States v, Janis, 428 u.s. 433, 446, 96 s. ct. 3021, 3028 
13
 On the other hand, defendants contend that even if there is no separate state 
constitutional interest, the warrant is otherwise sufficiently defective that under United States v. 
Leon. 468 U.S. 897,104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), the officers did not act in good faith in securing the 
warrant See infra at 43-44. 
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(1976)). Accord State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1263-64 (Utah 
1993). Because the federal rule was "designed to deter police 
misconduct rather than to punish the error of judges and 
magistrates," an exception to its blanket application was 
created- United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. at 916, 104 S. Ct. at 
3417. That exception recognizes: 
[ W]hen law enforcement officers have acted in 
objective good faith or their transgressions have been 
minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such 
guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the 
criminal justice system. Indiscriminate application of 
the exclusionary rule, therefore, may well "generate 
disrespect for the law and administration of justice." 
Accordingly, "as with any remedial device, the 
application of the [exclusionary] rule has been 
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives 
are thought most efficaciously served." 
Leon. 468 U.S. at 908, 104 S. Ct. at 3412-13. 
As defendants note, some states have rejected application of 
a good faith exception under their state constitutions (Br. App. 
at 36-38) . But defendants have not articulated a basis for this 
Court to reach a similar conclusion. See limited argument below 
at JR. 204 (counsel admitting that he was "standing flat footed" 
in response to court's opinion that officers acted in good faith 
by followed existing law); and lack of analysis on appeal, Br. 
App. at 36-38.) £&& alfiC Phillips v. Hatfield. 904 P.2d 1108, 
1110 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247, 249-50 (Utah 
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App. 1992) (court declines to reach merits of issue due to 
inadequate legal analysis). 
Furthermore, even those courts who have rejected a state 
good faith exception have recognized that *the more important 
issue is not the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on the 
conduct of the individual magistrates, but ~.he extent to which 
the rule helps preserve the integrity of the warrant issuing 
process as a whole." State V, Marsala/ 579 A.2d 58# 67 (Conn. 
1990) (cited in Thompson. 810 P.2d at 420 n.4). 
Here, neither future deterrence nor the integrity of the 
warrant process are implicated. These officers fully comported 
with all existing legal regulations at the time of the search 
and, therefore, their reliance on that precedent was necessarily 
in good faith. Compare State v. Shou:derblade. 905 P.2d 289, 294 
(Utah 1995)(results of roadblock search could not be saved where 
officers did not seek prior judicial approval in light of 
ambiguous existing law). By admitting that the officers acted 
reasonably in relying on Fourth Amendment law (Br. App. at 17; 
JR. 178, 204, 220, 223-24), defendants have essentially conceded 
this fact. Just as an attorney cannot be expected to anticipate 
a new judicial decision, State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 
1993) (ineffectiveness claim must be evaluated in light of the 
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law existing at the time of the trial), a police officer should 
not be considered "deficient" for acting in conformity with 
governing law at the time of the search. 
For these reasons, whatever the scope of a state 
exclusionary rule, a good faith exception should validate police 
action done in compliance with then-existing law. 
* * * 
While a minority of states have concluded, based on their 
state constitutions, that individuals have an expectation of 
privacy in their trash left at curbside for collection and have 
rejected a good faith exception to their state exclusionary rule, 
the weight of authority and reason clearly dictate against such 
results. This Court should reject defendants' arguments. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE SEARCH 
WARRANT WAS SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Even if defendants lack a constitutional interest in their 
trash, defendants nevertheless argue that the warrant was 
defective in that it lacked probable cause (Br. App. at 5-16). 
In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress a search 
warrant, the appellate court does not review the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause de novo but "simply decide[s] if 
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the 'magistrate had a substantial Lasis for concluding that there 
were enough facts within the affidavit to find that probable 
cause existed,'" State v. Vigh. 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 
1994) (citation omitted). That is, there must be "a substantial 
basis to conclude that -in the totality of circumstances, the 
affidavit adequately established,"' . . . *%"a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place".'" State V, Strgmfrerg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah 
App. 1989)(quoting State V. Drpnebur?/ 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah 
App. 1989) (quoting Illinois Y» GatSS/ 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. 
Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983))). 
Despite this standard, defendants attempt to piecemeal the 
affidavit by viewing each paragraph in isolation. But as this 
Court has concluded, the paragraphs of an affidavit are not to be 
be viewed independently of each other; instead, the affidavit 
must read as a whole with some paragraphs providing background 
and context to others. Cf. Vigh. 871 P.2d at 1033; Stromberg. 
783 P.2d at 57. At first glance, it appears that the trial court 
erroneously accepted defendants' approach and viewed some 
paragraphs as *irrelevant" because they were *spurious to the 
magistrate's determination of probable cause." See addendum C, 
Ruling at 102-03. But the trial court accepted defendants' 
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approach only as an analytical short-cut to its conclusion that 
the warrant was valid, for the court continued: "Assuming 
arguendo, that all the paragraphs mentioned by Defendants in 
their memorandum were determined to be irrelevant, and therefore, 
removed from consideration, State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952 (Utah 
App. 1993), there is still sufficient information in the 
affidavit to be establish probable cause." See addendum C, 
Ruling at 102. The trial court's conclusion is correct. 
1. Defendants' Claim that Some Paragraphs Should Be 
Excised as Irrelevant is Without Merit. 
Defendants argue that paragraphs 1-4 and 9-12 are irrelevant 
to the determination of probable cause. Defendants' are wrong. 
Paragraph 1 of the affidavit sets forth the background of 
the affiant, including his specialized training in the area of 
narcotics. See addendum B, Affidavit in Support of Search 
Warrant. Information concerning an officer's training and 
experience may legitimately be considered in determining probable 
cause: an officer's specialized drug trafficking training 
provides a foundation for any statements identifying substances 
as drugs or describing common elements of illicit trafficking. 
State v. Spuraeon. 904 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah App. 1995). Here the 
statements provide a foundation to establish the validity of 
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paragraph 6, setting forth the affiant's observation of marijuana 
and marijuana-related items in defendants' trash.14 
Additionally, the affiant's training and experience provide a 
basis for his statements concerning the common practices of drug 
traffickers contained in paragraphs 8-12. 
Paragraphs 2 & 3 concern defendants' past association with 
drugs. These paragraphs are relevant to show the continuing, 
rather than isolated, nature of defendants' involvement in 
illicit drug usage and/or trafficking. While prior bad acts 
without more cannot establish probable cause, Vigh, 871 P.2d at 
1033, prior criminal involvement may be a legitimate factor to be 
considered in combination with other information in determining 
probable cause, id. See also State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d 1203, 
1204 SL 12C- (Utah 1984) (upholding affidavit in support of search 
warrant ^ed in part on suspects ''extensive record" for same 
crirr m g investigated); Stromberg. 783 P.2d at 55 (noting 
defe ant's prior drug conviction corroborated informant's 
assertions of an on-going pattern of drug usage). See infra at 
14
 In Point 1(b)(6) of their brief, defendants argue that the magistrate should have required 
the police to produce the marijuana they field-tested so that the magistrate could examine it. 
Defendants cite no authority for such a requirement. Further, it is unnecessary for purposes of 
probable cause: the magistrate could rely on the officer's training and experience in identifying 
controlled substances. Defendants' argument establishes the relevance of including an officer's 
expertise in an affidavit. 
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38-41 for further argument considering the validity of these 
paragraphs. 
Paragraph 4 summarizes the method and timing of Provo's 
trash collection. This information is relevant to establishing 
the propriety of the time between normal pick-ups, which is 
directly relevant to establishing when the objects would 
reasonably have been placed in the garbage can. See addendum C, 
Ruling at 102. £££ slSQ State v, Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 886 
(Utah App. 1991) (affidavit should be given a "common-sense" 
reading, relying on Illinois V. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. 
Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983)). The relevance of paragraph 4 becomes 
even more self-evident when viewed in light of defendants' 
current claim that the items could have been in the garbage can 
for "weeks or months." See discussion infra at 37-38. 
Paragraphs 9, 10 and 12 reflect the affiant's knowledge, 
based on his specialized training and experience, of the common 
characteristics of drug traffickers. While these paragraphs do 
not independently establish probable cause for the search, they 
do define the parameters of the search. As such, they are 
relevant in limiting the scope of the search. 
Most interestingly, defendants attack paragraph 11 as being 
irrelevant. Paragraph 11 describes with particularity the home 
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to be searched, providing a detailed description of the color and 
configuration of the home and not simply relying on a street 
number. Inclusion of such paragraphs is not only standard but 
recommended for the protection of the public by preventing 
searches of the wrong home based on an erroneous numerical 
address, QfL. State v. Mclntire. 768 P.2d 970, 972-73 (Utah App. 
1989) (description in affidavit of place to be search may "cure" 
lack or mistake in description in warrant). 
Since the challenged paragraphs are relevant when read in 
the context of the entire affidavit, they were properly included 
and properly considered by the magistrate in issuing the warrant. 
2. Defendants' Claim that Some Paragraphs Should Be 
Excised as Stale or Improper Lacks Merit. 
Defendants next contend that paragraphs 2-8 should not be 
considered in determining the sufficiency of the affidavit 
because they contain stale information. Defendants' argument is 
two-fold: first, they assert that the information gained through 
inspection of their trash was stale; and second, they claim that 
inclusion of their prior involvement with drugs was too remote in 
time to be relevant. Neither claim undermines the validity of 
the warrant. 
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(A) The Reasonable Inference is that the 
Trash Was in the Garbage Can One Week or 
Less. 
The trial court rejected defendants' argument that the 
evidence in the trash can was stale. See addendum C, Ruling at 
102. The court found: "While it is conceivable that the trash 
could have been there for longer than a week# it is reasonable 
for the magistrate to conclude that the trash had been in the 
containers for a week or less." Id. This finding was supported 
by paragraph 4 of the affidavit, which established that 
defendants' trash was picked up on a weekly basis, and by 
paragraph 5, which stated that the trash cans were placed "in the 
street in front of [defendants] house." See addendum B, 
Affidavit. These facts support the reasonable inference that the 
contents was placed in the garbage can sometime between the 
weekly pick-ups. Defendants' assertion that the trash may have 
been there for months is speculation unsupported by "common 
sense." See Collard. 810 P.2d at 886. 
(B) The Inclusion of Defendants' Prior Bad 
Acts Supports in Part the Determination of 
Probable Cause. 
The affidavit in support of the search warrant was signed on 
June 8, 1994. One month before, in May 1994, defendant Smith 
pled guilty to possession of marijuana and possession of 
38 
paraphernalia based on incidents occurring" in January 1993. 
Additionally, two months before the warrant was secured, 
defendants Smith and Jackson claimed that several men broke into 
their home demanding drugs and money. See addendum B# Affidavit, 
Paragraphs 2 & 3. 
Defendants attacked the inclusion of this information as 
stale and additionally attacked the inclusion of the drug robbery 
as improper based on a grant of immunity from prosecution in 
connection with the April incident. After referring to both 
claims, the trial court ruled: "While Defendants [sic] do not 
support their position with any case law or statutory claim, it 
does strike the Court as improper to justify a search on the 
prior history of the individuals to be searched." See addendum 
C, Ruling at 101-02. The court then went on to conclude that the 
"Affidavit is not fatally flawed and that a substantial basis 
existed in the Affidavit, under current law, for the magistrate 
to issue the warrant.'' Id. at 101. It is unclear from this 
ruling if the court found the information to be either stale or 
improper. However, subsequently, in ruling on defendants' 
petition for certificate of probable cause, the trial court made 
clear that, in ruling on the motion to suppress, he deemed the 
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prior crimes information to be relevant and recent (JR. 140-41; 
SR. 149-50; NR. 143-44). 
nA mere passage of time does not necessarily invalidate the 
supporting basis for the warrant." State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 
127, 131 (Utah 1987). Instead, the issue is whether the 
information adds to the "determination that evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place." Brooks. 849 P.2d at 644 
(citing Gates. 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332). 
When the affidavit recites a mere isolated violation it 
would not be unreasonable to imply that probable cause 
dwindles rather quickly with the passage of time. 
However, where the affidavit properly recites facts 
indicating activity of a protracted and continuous 
nature, a course of conduct, the passage of time 
becomes less significant. 
Strombera. 783 P.2d at 57 (quoting United States v. Johnson. 461 
F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972)). 
Here defendants have challenged the sufficiency of the 
evidence in the trash to support probable cause because they 
argue small amounts of marijuana indicate only an isolated 
incident of use and not on-going activity of drug usage (Br. App. 
at 14). This is exactly why the prior crimes information is 
relevant. It establishes that two months prior to finding 
marijuana in the trash, defendants admitted that they possessed 
other controlled substances in the home. During that same 
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interval, defendant Smith, the mother of one defendant and 
common-law wife of other, pled guilty to drug possession arising 
from an incident the previous year. Certainly, these prior acts 
could not alone establish probable cause, but they are probative 
of the fact that the evidence found in the trash reflected an on-
going lifestyle, not merely an isolated incident. 
Defendants' next claim that the police intentionally 
disregarded the truth when they failed to include a statement in 
the affidavit that defendants had received immunity from 
prosecution for "any crime disclosed by [their] testimony arising 
out of incidents which occurred on April 13, 199411 in connection 
with the drug-related burglary and robbery at their home. See 
Immunity Grants (JR. 22-24; SR. 16-18; NR. 13-15). Again, 
defendants' argument lacks merit. 
An affiant may not intentionally, knowingly, or with 
reckless disregard for the truth omit information from an 
affidavit; if he does so, the omitted information must be 
inserted into the affidavit before making a determination of the 
affidavit's sufficiency. State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188, 191 
(Utah 1986) (citing Flunks V, Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 
S. Ct. 2674, 2684-85 (1978), and United States v. Ippolito. 774 
F.2d 1482, 1486-87 n.l (9th Cir. 1985) (other citations omitted)), 
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cert, denied. 480 U.S. 930 (1987). n[I]f the omission or 
misstatement materially affects the finding of probable cause, 
any evidence obtained under the improperly issued warrant must be 
suppressed." Nielsen. 727 P.2d at 191. 
Defendant questions the truthfulness of the information 
contained in paragraph 2 of the affidavit, which reads: 
On April 13, 1994, several unidentified men entered the 
home of Pat Smith and Brent Jackson at 770 South 1033 
West in Provo at 7:15 a.m. without permission. 
According to Smith and Jackson the men held them 
captive for several hours demanding drugs and money. 
The men wanted to know where the drugs were. 
Defendant does not contend that this information is incorrect, 
but argues that it is incomplete in that the police did not 
include that they had obtained this information from defendants 
after granting them immunity from prosecution. Defendants, 
however, do not establish how the omitted information is material 
or how its omission was misleading. 
Defendants' grants of immunity prohibited their prosecution 
for crimes they disclosed in connection with the April incident. 
They have not been prosecuted for those crimes. But the grants 
of immunity do not preclude the prosecution of defendants for 
crimes after April 1994, nor do they preclude the use of their 
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former testimony for some purpose other than prosecution (JR. 76-
78; SR. 85-87; NR. 79-81). 
Furthermore, inclusion of the omitted information concerning 
the immunity would not have diminished probable cause, if 
anything, it would have enhanced it by establishing that 
defendants themselves admitted, under reliable circumstances, 
that they store drugs in the home. 
3. Defendants' Argument that the Warrant is so 
Defective as to Preclude Good Faith Reliance is Without 
Merit. 
Apart from their state constitutional claim, defendants 
argue that the warrant--once the allegedly stale, misleading and 
irrelevant paragraphs are deleted--so lacks in probable cause 
that the police could not reasonably rely on it. 
The State submits that no good-faith analysis under United 
States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), is 
necessary because the affidavit is not defective and is supported 
by probable cause. Should this Court disagree and conclude that 
error occurred, the only error fatal to probable cause would be 
the exclusion of the evidence obtained from defendants' trash. 
For the reasons discussed supra at 28-32# the officers 
reasonably relied on existing precedent in obtaining and 
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including that information in the affidavit and, therefore, this 
Court should find their reliance to be in good faith. 
CPHCLVSIPN 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's denial of defendants' motion to suppress and affirm 
defendants' convictions based on their guilty pleas. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 9^")day of October, 1996. 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
I, HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION IN UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The following history may be found at the Utah State 
Archives under the title "Constitution State of Deseret and Utah 
Constitutions, Memorials to Congress, and Proceedings of 
Convention 1649-1959,•» Microfilm Document No. 080979, C. Reel I 
(1849-1695), Utah State Archives No. 700-0000-1400: 
1. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution of the 
State of Deseret (1649): 
The people shall be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and possessions, from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
2. Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of the 
State of Deseret (1872): 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not 
be violated; and not warrant shall issue but 
on probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place or places to be searched, and the 
person or persons, and thing or things, to be 
seized. 
3. Article I, Section 16 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah (1882) : 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not 
be violated; and not warrant shall issue but 
on probable cause, supported by ...- or 
affirmation, particularly desert ~ng the 
place or places to be searched, and the 
person or persons, and thing or things, to be 
seized. 
4. Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah (1887): 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not 
be violated, and not warrant shall issue but 
on probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
State of Utah (1895) (current provision): 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable seizures and searches shall not 
be violated; and not warrant shall issue but 
on probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, house, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OP UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAHf EX PARTB, 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
A NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF AND REQUEST FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT 
Comes now Jerry Harper, having been duly sworn, who deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am a sergeant with the Provo Police Department. I have 
been a peace officer since 1979 when I graduated from POST as the 
officer with the highest academic achievement in my class. During 
the time I have been a peace officer I have received over 225 hours 
of specialized training for law enforcement work including 185 
hours of training specific to narcotics work. Narcotics classes 
include training in surveillance, operation of surveillance and 
electronic investigatory equipment, field testing of drugs and drug 
recognition. As an officer I have participated in hundreds of 
operations involving the undercover purchase of narcotics and/or 
the arrest of persons for substance abuse related violations. I 
have experience working undercover providing first hand experience 
with narcotics trafficking. I have supervised narcotics 
investigations for the Provo Police Department since 1992. I am 
currently designated as the department trainer/specialist in the 
areas of fingerprinting, surveillance, video equipment, narcotics 
and drug recognition. 
2. On April 13, 1994, several unidentified men entered the 
home of Pat Smith and Brent Jackson at 770 South 1033 West in Provo 
at 7:15 a.m. without permission. According to Smith and Jackson 
the men held them captive for several hours demanding drugs and 
money. The men wanted to know where the drugs were. 
3. On May 3, 1994, Pat Smith plead guilty to possession of 
marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia in the Fourth 
Circuit Court. The crimes were alleged to have occurred January 
15, 1993 at the home of Linda Cannon in Orem. 
4. Provo City has a solid waste collection system. Each home 
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is assigned a specific can which is owned by the city. An 
additional can may be obtained for an additional fee. Once per 
week the cans are to be placed at curbside or in the street for 
collection. A city truck then mechanically picks up and empties 
the cans. 
5. On June 8, in the early morning hours, I went to the home 
of Pat Smith at 770 South 1033 West in Provo. There were two cans 
with the number •1033* stenciled in white paint on the side in the 
street in front of the house. I took the cans to the Police 
Department where I reviewed the contents. After I had finished I 
replaced the garbage in the cans and returned them to the street in 
front of the house. 
6. Within the cans I found marijuana stems, seeds, a 
marijuana cigarette along with zig-zag papers and a small piece of 
marijuana. I tested the small piece with a chemical reagent test 
which indicated positive for marijuana. 
7. I also found correspondence with the address of 770 South 
1033 West, Provo and the names of Pat Smith and Brent Jackson. The 
correspondence included a utility bill to Brent Jackson for natural 
gas. A phone bill for Brent and Pat Jackson was also located. 
8. The amounts of stems, seeds and marijuana in the garbage 
imply possession of small amounts for use. Such amounts of 
marijuana are typically packaged in bags of 1/8 ounce or less, 
quite small in volume. Such bags can quickly and easily be hidden 
in clothing or destroyed if notice is given of intent to search. 
9. Marijuana and paraphernalia are often kept in outbuildings 
and vehicles. Failure to search the curtilage of the residence 
together with the person of individuals present and vehicles 
located on the curtilage will likely result in officer's missing 
important evidence. 
10. It is my experience that most of the people I have 
encountered in connection with the unlawful use of marijuana also 
occasionally sell, sometimes paying for their use with profit from 
sales. It is so common as to be the rule rather than the 
exception, to find evidence related to production and/or 
distribution whenever marijuana is located in a residence. 
11. The residence is more particularly described as a two 
story duplex with tan brick and brown wood on the front. On the 
side the brick extends to the eaves. There is a carport on either 
side. The roof is gravel. The duplex is on the south side of 770 
South and faces north. "1033" is the west residence with the 
number "1033" mounted to the right of the door as you face the 
door. 
12. I expect to locate additional controlled substances in the 
residence together with associated paraphernalia including items 
used or capable of use for the storage, use, production, or 
Discovery Sent To 
Defense Attorney 
distribution of marijuana. 
KHBREFORE, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by 
this Court authorizing a search of the residence together with the 
curtilage and the person of all vehicles and individuals present 
within the home and curtilage at the time of the search for the 
presence of controlled substances together with associated 
paraphernalia including items used or capable of use for the 
storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana to be 
executed without notice of intent or authority in the daytime. 
Dated this <PT&&Y of June, 199 */, fl-.m. 
Affiant(/ 
Subscribed ,ito and sworn before me this 
, 1994, ££7m. 
fr^Al^ 
P day of 
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FOR OFHCAL P^mst* D»^T 
' KUtovioJ 
CARLYLE K. BRYSON, #0473 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
JAMES R. TAYLOR, #3199 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
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RELEASE- » v rHF. CO'JWJv ATTORNEY TO 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, EX PARTE, 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
A NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION 
SEARCH WARRANT 
TEE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH: 
Magistrate's 
Endorsement 
It has been established by oath or 
made or submitted to me this 
dlAt 
June, 1994, that there is probab 
cause to believe the following: 
% 
f o r m a t i o n 
£^Say of 
1. The property described below: 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of 
an offense; or 
is evidence of illegal conduct. 
2. The property described below is most probably located 
upon the person or at the premises also set forth 
below. 
3. The person or entity in possession of the property is 
a party to the alleged illegal conduct. 
4. The property described below may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed of, or secreted or physical harm may result 
to some person is prior notice is given of the search. 
NOW, THEREFORE YOU AND EACH OP YOU# are hereby directed to 
conduct a search of the residence and curtilage together with 
vehicles and the person of individuals within the curtilage located 
at the address of 770 South 1033 West, Provo, in Utah County, 
State of Utah# The premises are described as: 
A two story duplex with tan brick and brown 
wood on the front. On the side the brick 
extends to the eaves. There is a carport on 
either side. The roof is gravel. The duplex 
is on the south side of 770 South and faces 
north. •1033 * is the west residence with the 
number "1033 • mounted to the right of the door 
as you face the door. 
You are directed to search for the presence of the following 
property: 
Controlled substances together with associated 
paraphernalia including items used or capable 
of use for the storage, use# production, or 
distribution of marijuana. 
THIS KARRANT KAY BE SERVED: 
IN THE DAYTIME 
THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED WITHOUT NOTICE OF AUTHORITY OR 
PURPOSE BEING GIVEN BY THE OFFICER 
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring 
the property forthwith before me at the above court or to hold the 
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You 
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person 
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where 
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall 
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with 
a written inventory of any property seized, identifying the place 
where the property is being held. 
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED KITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE 
OF ISSUANCE. 
0 da\ Dated this y of June, 1994, / / [S~3 JKvx. 
^<^^v 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN IKS FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Fou*>* JuoiDa1 District Court 
o< Uic^ County, State of Utah 
- A ^ , A D CM.UH, Clerl' 
Der/J--
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
PATRICIA E. SMITH, 
RAQUEL NIELSEN, 
BRENT JACKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 941400506 
CASE NO. 941400507 
CASE NO. 941400508 
DATE: March 23, 1995 
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants9 Motion to suppress. Oral arguments 
were heard on February 7, 1995. Defendants appeared and were represented by Thomas H. 
Means, with the State being represented by James R. Taylor, Deputy Utah County Attorney. 
The Court, after carefully considering the memoranda and oral arguments, now enters the 
following: 
RULING 
L 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
On the eighth of June 1994f Sergeant Jerry Harper, of the Provo Police Department 
searched the trash receptacles, (two), of the Defendants" home after they had been placed in 
the street for collection. According to the information in the affidavit in support of the 
requested warrant, the officer identified no reason for the search of the trash cans. He did, 
however, mention two previous incidents which implicated the residents in drug involvement: 
1 
• */ v/ 
y 1) approximately 36 days prior to the search of the trash receptacles, one of the residents pled 
guilty to possession of marijuana and paraphernalia; 2) approximately 56 days prior to the 
search of the receptacles, two of the residents were involved in an incident where several men 
entered their home and held them captive while demanding money and drugs. 
Sergeant Harper found within the receptacles some marijuana stems, seeds, Zig-Zag 
papers, and a small "piece91 of marijuana. Also found was some personal correspondence with 
the names of two of the residents of the home in question. Based on the results of the search 
an affidavit was prepared and submitted to a magistrate. The Affidavit also mentioned the 
prior drug-related incidents. A warrant was issued for the home, and further evidence was 
found during the search of the home. Defendants were arrested and charged with possession 
of drugs and paraphernalia. 
H 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
(1) Is the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant fatally flawed, and 
therefore, lacking a substantial basis for issuance of a warrant? 
(2) Do Utah citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash placed in a city 
provided container and left at the edge of the city street for pickup? 
EL 
DISCUSSION 
A. Sufficiency of the Affidavit 
Defendants argue that some of the information contained in the Affidavit in support of 
:he warrant is irrelevant. This Court agrees. Several of the paragraphs in the Affidavit 
2 
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include information which is curious to the magistrate's determination of probable cause. 
However, such information does not invalidate the warrant The burden placed upon the State 
in placing an affidavit before a magistrate is *a reasonable belief that the evidence sought is 
located at the place indicated by the policeman's affidavit." State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640, 
643 (Utah App. 1993). Assuming, arguendo, that all the paragraphs mentioned by Defendants 
in their memorandum were determined to be irrelevant, and therefore, removed from 
consideration, State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993), there is still sufficient 
information in the iiffidavit to establish probable cause. Under Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213 
(1983), a "totalitv of the circumstances" analysis is proper and, even with the limited 
information left after removing the alleged irrelevant information, a magistrate could have a 
reasonable belief that the "evidence sought," (drugs), would be found "at the place indicated." 
BrocV- 849 P.2d at 643. 
Defendants* argument that the evidence in the trash receptacles was 'stale1 is 
i ^rsuasive. While it is conceivable that the trash could have been there for longer than a 
**^ ek, it is reasonable for the magistrate to conclude that the trash had been in the containers 
for a week or less. Thus a "common-sense reading of the affidavit" would suggest that drugs 
would probably be in the home. State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127,131 (Utah 1987). 
Defendants9 argument that the prior bad acts were stale or improper may have some 
validity. Sergeant Harper does appear to justify his search of the trash receptacles by 
including references to prior involvement and alleged involvement with drugs. (See Affidavit 
paragraphs 2 & 3). While Defendants do not support their position with any case law or 
3 
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statutory claim, it does strike the Court as improper to justify a search on the prior history of 
the individuals to be searched. 
Other arguments made by the Defendants are neither persuasive nor supported by 
substantive law. The Court finds that the Affidavit is not fatally flawed and that a 
substantial basis existed in the Affidavit, under current law, for the magistrate to issue the 
warrant 
B. The Right of Privacy in Garbage under the Federal Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution. 
The next issue to be resolved is whether Utah citizens have a protectable expectation 
of privacy in garbage placed in a city provided container and left at the edge of the street for 
pickup? This issue has two parts: 1) The protection of an expectation of privacy in garbage 
allowed by the provisions of the U.S. Constitution and federal case law; and 2) The 
protection of an expectation of privacy in garbage under the provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. 
1. Protection under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 
The controlling federal case is California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), which 
establishes the principle that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash placed 
outside the curtilage of the home. Id. at 37. The Supreme Court did not address whether 
searches of garbage left within the curtilage of the home were prohibited under the Fourth 
Amendment I£. While the present case is similar to Greenwood, it can, contrary to the 
assertions of the State, \z distinguished from Greenwood. In Greenwood, the police officer 
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had recei that illicit drugs had been shipped to the address 
in question, and acting on that information began a surveillance of the home. Based on 
suspicious activity at the address in the course of ilk1 sinveiiiiincf, iiiiie1 cjiitcn searched the 
trash and found sufficient evidence to establish the probable cause necessary for issuance of a 
warrant I& ** 37-38. In the instant case, much of what supported the actions it'll 1 |>nl < 
tiif Umryyoe'd ere is lacking. However, in spite of these distinguishing facts the warrantless 
search of the garbage in the instant case did not violate the two prong test of Greenwood. 14 
at V9" 
In applying the first part of the Greenwood test the United States Supreme Court held 
that such warrantless searches "would violate the Fourth Amendment 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage . . ." LJ. While no affidavits 
or other evidence were submitted with memoranda to show that defendants had such an 
expectation of pi i ac; in tl icii gai bage. coi i nsel at oral argument offered to have defendants 
testify to that fact The Court declined such testimony as being unnecessary to reach a 
determination on the expectations of the defendants. 
be accepted that the defendants had such an expectation of privacy; this, however, is not the 
end of the federal protection examination. 
The s: cc Iid part of the Greenwood test must also be met before protection is warranted 
under tije Fourth Amendment — the expectation of privacy must be one that "society accepts 
as objectively reasonai in Greenwood determined that such 
an expectation of privacy in garbage Is not reasonable when the garbage is placed on the curb 
uf. Jongside the street because it theu becomes vulnerable to an unscrupulous per s ::>iI >r 
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scavenging animal. Because a reasonable person would know that such garbage is available 
to curious members of the public, any expectation of privacy is unreasonable. A reasonable 
person cannot expect "police . . .to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that 
could have been observed by any member of the public." IsL at 41. 
In the instant case, the Defendants left their garbage at the edge of the city street, 
outside of the curtilage of the home, for collection where it was available for the possible 
perusal of anyone who wished to take the time to do so. Therefore, there is no question that 
the second test under Greenwood has not been met. However, the U.S. Supreme Court also 
suggested that "States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent 
constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution." IsL at 43. The Court 
recognizes that while a state may not construe its own state constitution to infringe upon the 
rights set forth in the Federal Constitution, a state may provide for greater protection of its 
citizens' rights than that provided by the Federal Constitution. Therefore, this Court must yet 
consider whether the subject search was a violation of state guarantees embodied in the Utah 
State Constitution. 
2. Protection under the Utah Constitution. 
There are some additional facts, established from the presentation of evidence through 
proffer and by the Court taking judicial notice, which are pertinent to the state constitutional 
analysis. These facts are: 1) garbage containers in the city of Provo are owned and supplied 
by the city; 2) garbage collection occurs weekly and on a day certain; 3) collection is made 
by city employees in city owned trucks; 4) the garbage containers in question were owned by 
the city of Provo; 5) the garbage container in question- was placed on city property, 
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os:ensibly for collection purposes, and was putside the curtilage of the residence; 6) no local 
ordinance exists which prohibits any person from ciist i u: bing garbage 
for collection or in anyway restricting access to such garbage. 
The final issue is whether there is a greater protection of onefs expectation of privacy 
under the UtaJ Constitution. Specifically, does Utah society, under the state 
constitution, accept as oi tively reasonable, an expectation of privacy in garbage? 
Defendants argue ' the"" InMniy nl lliiili i<, tini.,j ,i nriil "h a societal expectation 
that individuals have a reasonable belief that their garbage would be free from governmental 
intrusion. The original pioneer settlers of the region suffered :i i nicl i at tl ,e hands of a i i :>i is 
state governments because of their religious beliefs and communal, ecclesiastically directed 
society. In three different states the government either ignored or condoned the persecution 
eventually flee to, and settle the Utah basin. Even 
after this region was settled, the people, especially the society leaders, continued to suffer 
persecution at the hands of federal 
homes and effects without warrants in an attempt to enforce the anti-polygamy laws. (See 
Defendants* Memorandum pp. 24 • 25). Defendants, therefore, argue that such actions created 
distrust and si ispic ion of government on the part of the drafters of the Utah Constitution. 
This mistrust and suspicion would have motivated them to expect greater protection against 
such invasit ronically, the 
wording of the appropriate provision, Article 1, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution is nearly 
identical to the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and therefore, at first glance 
would appear to hold the same level j f protection as does the Federal Constitution. 
Whether the Utah constitution supports an expectation of privacy in trash is unresolved 
in Utah. Other states have found that an expectation of privacy is reasonable under their state 
constitutions. While the determination of other sovereign states is not determinative of the 
question, the rationale and reasoning used by them may be helpful in considering the issue. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey found in State v. Hcmpele. 576 A.2d 793, (N.I 
1990), that under the relevant provision of that state Constitution, Article I, Section 7f an 
expectation of privacy need only be reasonable.1 LL &t 802. The facts in Hempele. (which 
was a consolation of two cases), are similar to the facts in the instant case; the garbage was 
placed for collection near the street and then removed by police and searched. The New 
Jersey court appears to reach its conclusion based on concerns that "[cjlues to people's most 
private affairs can be found in their garbage.... A plethora of personal information can be 
culled from garbage: a single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and 
recreational habits of the person who produced it." Hempele 576 A.2d at 802-803. Further, 
local ordinances prohibited "any person to * * * disturb * * * garbage * * * placed on any 
curb, street or public place." I$L at 805, (citation omitted). 
The Supreme Court of Indiana also found that an expectation of privacy in garbage is 
reasonable. Moran v. Indiana, 625 N.E. 1231 (Ind. 1993). The facts of the Indiana case are 
again similar to the instant case: garbage had been placed in plastic containers and set out for 
1
 The New Jersey Constitution reads "The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons/ houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly uescribing the 
place to be searched and the paprcs and things to b* seized." 
N.J. Const, of 1947 ar'c.I, p*ca 7. 
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collection at the end of the residential driveway approximately a foot from c 
contains which the police removed and searched. In 
Moran the court stated that *[u]nder Indiana law, warrantless searches are presumptively 
unreasonable, and the burden is placed on the stale to sho b * that the search falls within one of 
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. The common thread underlying the 
recognized exceptions is the concept of 'exigent circumstances* 
of a warrant impractical or inadvisable because of a danger of harm to individuals or the 
potential destruction of evidence." I& at 1239. The court went on to find that no exigent 
c the garbage violated the protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure found in Art. I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution.2 
In State v. Tanaka, H 1.1 "",'  IS ' Tie Court of Hawaii found 
that an expectation of privacy existed in garbage. The facts of the Tanaka case, which entail 
three consolidated cases, are similar to the instant case but there is one important 
tliMinguJ1,liirife* (Ji.ifdi fcrWic-the garbage searched was located within the private property of 
the individual being charged Thus, the police had to trespass onto the private property to 
gain access to the garbage e of the three consolidated cases 
the garbage was at the curbside of the defendants property. In the view of the Hawaii court, 
the Hawaii Constitution, article I, § 7 "recognizes an expei t,]fn > • I" j ,,; , br,\ u\ l "l 
2
 The In(jiana constitution reads: "The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violate^; 
and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized." Article If * 11, 
Indiana Constitution. 
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parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights." 14. at 1276. The Hawaii court went on to 
[pjeople reasonably believe that police will not indiscriminately rummage through their 
trash bags to discover their personal effects. Business records, bills, correspondence, 
magazines, tax records, and other telltale refuse can reveal much about a person's 
activities, associations, and beliefs. If we were to hold otherwise, police could search 
everyone's trash bags on their property without any reason and thereby learn of their 
activities, associations, and beliefs. It is exactly this type of overbroad governmental 
intrusion that article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution was intended to prevent.1 
Tanaka 701 R2d at 1276,1277. 
The Hawaii court explained that an expectation of privacy did not preclude any 
searches by police of garbage but required that a warrant be obtained or that exigent 
circumstances be shown which would reasonably justify a warrantless search. I& 
The state of Washington also has found an expectation of privacy in garbage under the 
Washington State Constitution. In State v. Boland. 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990), 
Washington's highest court utilized criteria previously set down in State v. GunwalL 720 P.2d 
3
 The text of article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution 
reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches, 
seizures and invasions of privacy shall not be violated; and 
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized 
or the communications sought to be intercepted. 
Interestingly enough the Hawaii Constitution has an 
additional provision regarding the right of privacy. This is 
article I, 5 6, which reads: 
The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall 
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state 
interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to 
implement this right. 
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fun1- ( W t o l I >,fii,.,in mi 1 1 - i ml dif ference uw provide a basis for a conclusion which would 
differ from that reached under the Federal Constitution; 2 ) differences in parallel provisions 
o f the state and federal constitutions could dictate varying conclusions; <v 
history may reflect an intention to confer greater protection than the federal provisions; 4 ) 
Previously established state law may provide die basis to define die scope o f a state 
5) Differ* o f the constitutions may require disparate 
results, (e.g. the state may guarantee rights which are not protected on a federal level); ^ 
The matter may be o f particular state Gun wall. 7 2 0 P.2d at 812 , 813 . 
The Washington Supreme Court rejected die federal analysis stating that "[w]hile a 
person must reasonably expect a licensed trash collector will r e m o \ e 
c i " expectation does not also infer an expectation o f governmental intrusion." Boland. 
800 P.2d at 1117. Further, the Washington court using the criteria set forth in Gun wall found 
that a search o f garbage u «• m i i i i in |l • |MK M* affairs and therefore a violation o f 
the Washington Constitution, Art. I, § 7.4 & at 1114-1116 . 
O f the states which have found a greater protection 
the federal scheme al lows, two have significant constitutional textual differences from the 
Fourth Amendment; both Hawaii and Washington have unique and explicit wording which 
1 der reading o f protection than found in the Fourth A m e n d m e n t 
Indiana and N e w Jersey, on the other hand, have state constitutional provisions which 
are nearly identical to t:J* ,e Fc >iu (ii A i i HE i : ci i i i intt ai id th i: I Ji alii provision, In both the Indiana 
4
 The Washington Constitution provides at Art. I, § 7 that: 
"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home 
invaded, without authority of law*" 
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and New Jersey cases, the facts were essentially the same as in the instant case, and the 
highest state court still found a heightened level of protection of an expectation of privacy in 
garbage. 
However, while recognizing that some states have found a greater level of privacy 
protection in their state constitutions, this Court must also recognize that the majority of states 
have followed the federal analysis, and have not found independent grounds to provide for 
greater protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment in this area.5 
5
 Hillman v. State, 834 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1992) (defendant 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage bags left at 
curb for collection); Walls v. State, 536 So.2d 137, 138-39 (Ala. 
Crixn. App. 1988), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989) (search of 
defendant's garbage located in front of his residence did not 
violate a proprietary interest in it, citing Greenwood); State 
v. Moonev, 588 A.2d 145, 157 n. 14, cert, denied, 502 U.S. 919, 
112 S.Ct. 330 (Conn. 1991) (observed that trash bags, while 
closed containers, may not carry a reasonable expectation of 
privacy when placed beyond the curtilage of a home for 
collection); State v. Fisher, 591 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1991) (concluded that defendants sufficiently exposed 
their garbage to the public to defeat Fourth Amendment protection 
when placing it in plastic cans located in front of the house on 
the road right-of-way); Perkins v. State, 398 S.E.2d 702, 704 
(Ga. App. 1990) (followed Greenwood^; People v. Collins, 478 
N.E.2d 267, 278-79, cert, denied, 474 U.S. 935 (111. 1985) (found 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in a garbage bag left on a 
second floor landing of an outside stairway because such area was 
an openly accessible common area of the apartment building); 
State v. Henderson, 435 N.W.2d 394 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (found no 
violation of the Iowa Constitution where evidence was seized from 
trash bags that were tied shut and placed in metal garbage cans); 
In re Forfeiture of U.S. Currencyf 450 N.W.2d 93, 94 (Mich. App. 
1989) (followed Greenwood)i State v. Krech, 403 N.W.2d 634, 
637-38 (Minn. 1987) (concluded that defendants did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage wrapped in plastic 
bags and placed in cans in back of a duplex a few feet away from 
an alley where defendants customers typically walked near the 
garbage in route to the back entrance); State v. Texel. 433 
N.W.2d 541, 543 (Neb. 1989) (held that no reasonable expectation 
of privacy exists in garbage which has been made accessible to 
the public); Commonwealth v. Perduef 564 A.2d 489, 493 (Pa. 
Super. 1989), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 68 (1990) (found no 
12 
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In the states which found a level of privacy protection greatei iiiw the iff J'.1 nil ?i I cuie, 
a philosophical argument-that unless restraints are placed 
on the police powers of government, those who exercise those powers will abuse it. There is 
DO question that the general put % the police began to randomly pick up 
garbage placed in front of residences' looking for evidence of wrongdoing. Even those 
citizens who are model citizens would likely become paranoid about tlieu In ^ and examine 
each item discarded, looking for anything which could or might lead to possible arrest or even 
public embarrassment Such arguments have a certain attra- j^ess in that they are easily 
recon of the protection inherent in the Bill of Rights. 
However, philosophical arguments are often stretched too far. The mere parading of a list of 
horribles does not make and personnel constraints 
placed upon police make such actions unlikely. In the various cases examined by this Court 
the police have not randomly selected an individuals garbage, i I ii :" h »ii nable 
suspicion that illegal activity was taking place within the house from which the garbage came. 
Reaching a balance between the two conflicting ideas of personal liberty and 
communal safety requires a shifting of resources and authority because societal 
values change. Not long ago, each home would bum its own garbage and spread the ashes to 
the wind-today society does not accept such 
Society has developed different technology to handle the garbage produced in day-to-day 
reasonable expectation of privacy £n garbage left for collection 
subject to public inspection); State v. Stevens. 367 N-W.2d 788, 
797, cert, denied, 474 U 3 , 852 (Wis. 1985) (found that, as trash 
moves farther from the home, any expectation of privacy in it is 
diminished)* 
living. These technology changes have influenced the way we, as a society, view personal 
liberty. Any determination of the expectations of society must be weighed against the norms 
of today, as influenced by the past, but not by the values and standards of the past. 
In our highly mobile society it would be difficult for someone to remember which 
states accept an expectation of privacy in garbage and which do not A uniform standard has 
great appeal because of the certainty and stability which it engenders. However, uniformity 
benefits ys are not, standing alone, sufficient to determine whether Utah society accepts the 
federal scheme of privacy protection in garbage. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed expectation of privacy in garbage directly. 
The Utah Supreme Court has, however, on at least one occasion interpreted the provisions of 
the Utah Constitution in a manner which may be read to expand the civil liberties of the 
citizens of Utah beyond the federal threshold. See State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 
1991), (recognized an expectation of privacy in bank records under state constitution where 
the federal constitution does not). The facts of Thompson are sufficiently different from the 
instant case to distinguish it from the instant case and for Thompson to be insufficient to 
support a greater expectation of privacy in garbage under the Utah Constitution than the 
Federal Constitution. 
It seems to this Court that any decision which announces a heightened expectation of 
privacy in garbage, under a state constitutional analysis, must fairly, reasonably, and clearly 
articulate the reasons. Any such decision should not simply be an attempt to viscerally 
sidestep Greenwood. The minority arguments in Greenwood are compelling and persuasive, 
in the estimation of this Court, but they have failed in every jurisdiction in this country which 
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has considered the issue under a Fourth Amendment analysis, and prevailed in only two 
joi isdictions, Indiana and New Jersey, under a'state constitutional analysis where the facts are 
anywhere similar to this case. 
Regardless of how persuaded this I iiij mi il I" lh llllii iiiiinnih urn1 in breenwoocl this 
Court canna reasonably find anything in Utah's unique constitutional history which would 
dictate a resc different from Greenwood. A recitation of Utah Mormon pioneer polygamous 
battles with federal agents is interesting, but far from relevant and convincing on the very 
narrow issue before this Court. A mere substitution of a result this Court favors, without 
seiung friiil'i i ciii iew, obi I^IWC, sulis'ianii *'r, iinml iininilahlf considerations, is judicially 
disingenuous, and therefore, would simply subordinate the Fourth Amendment result to this 
Court's personal predilections. Certainly that is no way to adopt a bod
 r ol 'Jml • > -« nii.tiiutunal 
law which would give an; guidance and direction. The Court suggests that major departures 
from soundly establish?*- ? earth Amendment jurisprudence should be announced by Utahfs 
appellate :: 01 i i ts, i i : t b :~w court judges. 
Lastly, even if this Court were to find a heightened expectation of privacy in garbage 
under a state constitutional analysis, lluii I uniil MIDIIUI lio Moran v. Indiana. 
1231 J;-4u, would sustain the subject search. In Moran the Indiana Supreme Court applied a 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained during a warrantless search 
of garbage put out for disposal, even though the Court later found the search violated its state 
constitution. fcL Here, as there, no state court precedent addressed the constitutionality of 
:ourt held thp| I . ' •  reasonable for the police to conclude 
that the defendants lacked a privacy interest in the garbage. 
15 
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Because the Utah Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of an expectation 
of privacy in garbage, and no support is found in state lower court rulings to support a result 
different from the federal model, the federal threshold must prevail This Court, while 
acknowledging the compelling arguments on both sides of the issue, therefore, determines that 
no reasonable expectation of privacy exists as to the trash placed by Defendants in containers 
owned and provided by the city, and left in the street for collection by city employees. 
Neither, the Fourth Amendment, nor Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution is 
implicated and, therefore, no warrant was necessary to conduct the search. 
IV. 
DECISION 
(1) The probable cause Affidavit, filed in support of the search warrant, while arguably 
containing spurious information, is not fatally flawed and a magistrate could reasonably 
believe that the evidence sought would be found in the home. Accordingly, the motion to 
quash the warrant is denied. 
(2) The search of trash, placed in a city owned receptacle, left on the city street, with the 
anticipation that it would be picked up by city employees, is not a violation of Defendants' 
16 
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TrlHREFORE, Defendants' Motion to Suppress is denied. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, thissS day of /fm</^j\^%, 
BY THE COURT 
cc: 7 nomas H. Means, Esq. 
James R. Taylor, Esq. 
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ADDENDUM D 
Seven 
On Dumpster 
Diving 
MeMm cMMHNVr MW AMMMiM p^MST 
VfCRfMr | 0 W MV 9 0 0 1 WJmXwwtm* 
T 
JL^/ong before I began Dumpster diving I was impressed 
with Dumpstersf enough so that I wrote the Merriam* 
Webster research service to discover what I could about the 
word Dumpster. I teamed from them that it is a proprietary 
word belonging to the Dempster Dumpier company. Since 
then I have dutifully capitalized the word, although k was 
lowercased in almost all the citations Merriam-Webster pho-
tocopied for me. Dempster's word is too apt. I have never 
heard these things called anything but Dumpsters. I do not 
know anyone who knows the generic name for these objects. 
From time to time I have heard a wino or hobo give some 
corrupted credit to the original and call them Dipsy Dump* 
iters. 
I began Dumpster diving about a year before I became 
homeless. 
I prefer the word stsvtnging and use the word $ammging 
when I mean to be obscure. I have heard people, evidently 
meaning to be polite, use the word foraging, but I prefer to 
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reserve that word for gathering nuts and berries and such, 
which I do also according to the season and the opportunity. 
Dumpster Jiving seems to me to be a little too cute and, in my 
case9 inaccurate because I lack the athletic ability to lower 
myself into the Dumpstcrs as the true divers do, much to 
their increased profit. 
I like the frankness of the word u*vtnging9 which I can 
hardly think of without picturing a big bbek snail on an 
aquarium watt 1 live from the refuse of others. I am a scav-
enger. 1 think it a sound and honorable niche, although if I 
could I would naturally prefer to live the comfortable con* 
sumer life, perhaps—and only perhaps—as a slightly lest 
wasteful consumer, owing to what I have learned as a scav-
enger. 
While Ltzbeth and I were still living in the shack on Av-
enue B as my savings ran out, I put almost all my sporadic 
income into rent. The necessities of daily life I began to ex-
tract from Dumpstcrs. Yes, we ate from them. Except for 
jeans, all my clothes came from Dumpstcrs. Doom boxes, 
candles, heckling, toilet paper, a virgin male love doll, med-
icine, books, a typewriter, dishes, furnishings, and change, 
sometimes amounting to many dollars—I acquired many 
things from the Dumpstcrs. 
I have learned much as a scavenger. I mean to put some of 
what I have learned down here, beginning with the practical 
art of Dumpster diving and proceeding to the abstract. 
What b safe to eat? 
After all, the finding of objects is becoming something of 
an urban art. Even respectable employed people will some* 
times find something tempting sticking out of a Dumpster or 
standing beside one. Quite a number of people, not all of 
them of the bohemian type, are willing to brag that they 
found this or that piece in the trash. But eating from Dump-
stcrs is what separates the dilettanti from the professionals. 
Eating safely from the Dumpstcrs involves three principles: 
using the senses and common sense to evaluate the condition 
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of the found materials, knowing the Dumpstcrs of a given 
area and checking them regularly, and seeking always to an-
swer the question "Why was this discarded?** 
Perhaps everyone who has a kitchen and a regular supply 
of groceries has, at one time or another, made a sandwich and 
eaten half of it before discovering mold on the bread or got 
a mouthful of milk before realizing the milk had turned. 
Nothing of the sort is likely to happen to a Dumpster diver 
because he is constantly reminded that most food is discarded 
for a reason. Yet a lot of perfecdy good food can be found in 
Dumpstcrs. 
Canned goods, for example, turn op fairly often in the 
Dumpstcrs I frequent. All except die most phobic people 
would be willing to eat from a can, even if it came from a 
Dumpster. Canned goods are among the safest of foods to be 
found in Dumpstcrs but are not utterly foolproof. 
Although very rare with modem canning methods, botu-
lism is a possibility. Most other forms of food poisoning 
seldom do tasting harm to a healthy person, but botulism is 
almost certainly fatal and often the first symptom is death. 
Except for carbonated beverages, all canned goods should 
contain a slight vacuum and suck air when first punctured. 
Bulging, rusty, and dented cans and cans that spew when 
punctured should be avoided, especially when the contents 
are not very acidic or syrupy. 
Heat can break down the botulin, but this requires much • 
more cooking than most people do to canned goods. To the 
extent that botulism, occurs at all, of course, it can occur in 
cans cm pantry shelves as well as in cans from Dumpstcrs.* 
Need I say that home-canned goods are simply too risky to 
be recommended. 
from time to time one of my companions, aware of the 
source of my provisions, will ask, "Do you think these crack-
en are really safe to eat?M [x>r some reason k U most c>ften the 
crackers they ask about. 
This question has always made me angry. O f course I 
would not offer my companion anything I had doubts about. 
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But more than that, I wonder why he cannot evaluate the 
condition o f the crackers for himself. I have no special knowl-
edge and I have been wrong before. Since he knows where 
the food comes from, it seems to me he ought to assume 
some o f the responsibility for deciding What he will put in hit 
mouth. For myself I have few qualms about dry foods sucfi 
as crackers, cookies, cereal, chips, and pasta i f they are free of 
Visible contaminates and still dry and crisp. Most often such 
things are found in the original packaging, which is not so 
much a positive sign as it is the absence o f a negative one. 
Raw fruits and vegetables with intact skins seem perfectly 
safe to me . excluding o f course the obviously rotten. Many 
are discarded for minor imperfections that can be pared away. 
Leafy vegetables, grapes, cauliflower, broccoli, and similar 
things may be contaminated by liquids and may be imprac-
tical to wash. . 
Candy, especially hard candy, is usually safe i f it has not 
drawn ants. Chocolate is often discarded only because k has 
become discolored as the cocoa butter de-emulsified. Can-
dying, after all. is one method o f food preservation because 
pathogens d o not like very sugary substances. 
All o f these foods might be found in any Dumpster and 
can be evaluated with some confidence largely cm the basb o f 
appearance. Beyond these arc foods that cannot be correctly 
evaluated without additional information. 
I began scavenging by pulling pizzas out o f the Dumpster 
behind a pizza delivery shop. In general, prepared food re* 
quires caution, but in this case I knew when the shop closed 
and went to the Dumpster as soon as the last o f the help left. 
Such shops often get prank orders; both the orders and the 
products made t o fill them are called bogm. Because help 
seldom stays long at these places, pizzas are often made with 
the wrong topping, refused o n delivery for being cold, or 
baked incorrectly. The products to be discarded are boxed up 
because inventory is kept by counting boxes: A boxed pizza 
can be written off; an unboxed pizza does not ex i s t 
I never placed a bogus order to increase the supply o f 
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pizzas and I believe no one else was scavenging in this Dump* 
ster. But the people in the shop became suspicious and began 
to retain their garbage in the shop overnight. While it bsted 
I had a steady supply of fresh, sometimes warm pizza. Be-
cause I knew the Dumpster I knew the source of the pizza, 
uttd because I visited the Dumpster regularly I knew what 
was fresh and what was yesterday's. 
The area I frequent is inhabited by many affluent college 
students. I am not here by chance; the Dumpsters in this area 
ate very rich. Students throw out many good things, includ-
ing food. In particular they tend to throw everything out 
when they move at the end of a semester, before and after 
breaks, and around midterm, when many of them despair of 
college. So I find it advantageous to keep an eye on the 
academic calendar. 
Students throw food away around breaks because they do 
not know whether it has spoiled or will spoil before they 
return. A typical discard is a half jar of peanut butter. In fact, 
nonorganic peanut butter does not require refrigeration and 
is unlikely to spoil in any reasonable time. The student does 
not know that, and since it b Daddy's money, the student 
decides not to take a chance. Opened containers require cau-
tion and some attention to the question. "Why was this dis-
carded?" But in the case of discards from student apartments, 
the answer may be that the item was thrown out through 
careles*»«"ts. ignorance, or wastefulness. This can sometimes 
be deduced when the item is found with many others, in* 
eluding some that are obviously perfectly good. 
Some students, and others, approach defrosting a freezer 
by chucking out the whole lot. Not only do the circum-
stances of such a find tdl die story, but also the mass of 
frozen goods stays cold for a long time and items may be 
found still frozen or freshly thawed. 
Yogurt, cheese, and sour cream are items that ait often 
thrown out while they ate still good. Occasionally I find a 
cheese with a spot of mold, which of course I just pare off. 
and because it is obvious why such a cheese was discarded. I 
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treat it with less suspicion than an apparently perfect cheese 
found in similar circumstances* Yogurt is often discarded, 
still sealed, only because the expiration date on the carton had 
passed* This is one of my favorite finds because yogurt will 
keep for several days, even in warm weather. 
Students throw out canned goods and staples at the end of 
semesters and when they give up college at midterm. Drugs, 
pornography, spirits, and the like are often discarded when 
parents are expected—Dad's Day, for example. And spirits 
also turn up after big party weekends, presumably discarded 
by the. newly reformed. Wine and spirits, of course, keep 
perfectly well even once opened, but die same cannot be said 
of beer. 
My test for carbonated soft drinks is whether they still fin 
vigorously* Many juices or other beverages are too acidic or 
too syrupy to cause much concern, provided they are not 
visibly contaminated. I have discovered nasty molds in veg-
etable jukes, even when the product was found under its 
original seal; I recommend that such products be decanted 
slowly into a dear glass. Liquids always require some care. 
One hot day I found a large jug of Pat O'Brien's Hurricane 
mix. The jug had been opened but was still ice cold. I drank 
three Urge glasses before it became apparent to me that some* 
one had added the rum to the mix, and not a little rum. I 
never tasted the rum, and by the time I began to fed the 
effects I had already ingested a very Urge quantity of the 
beverage. Some divers would have considered this a boon, 
but being suddenly intoxicated in a public place in the early 
afternoon is not my idea of a good time. 
I have heard of people maliciously contaminating discarded 
food and even handouts, but mostly I have heard of this from 
people with vivid imaginations who have had no experience 
with the Dumpsters themselves. Just before the pizza shop 
stopped discarding its garbage at night, jalapenos began 
showing up on most of the thrown-out pizzas. If indeed this 
was meant to discourage me, it was a wasted effort because 
I am a native Texan. 
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For myself, I avoid game, poultry, pork, and egg-based 
foods, whether I find them raw or cooked. I seldom have the 
means to cook what I find, but when I do I avail myself of 
plentiful supplies of beef, which is often in very good con* 
dition. I suppose fish becomes disagreeable before it becomes 
dangerous. Uzbeth is happy to have any such thing that is 
past its prime and, in fact, does not recognize fish as food 
until it is quite strong. 
Home leftovers, as opposed to surpluses from restaurants, 
are very often bad. Evidently, especially among students, 
there is a common type of personality that carefully wraps up 
even the smallest leftover and shoves k into the back of the 
refrigerator for six months or so before discarding H. Char-
acteristic of this type are the reused jars and margarine tubs to 
which the remains are committed. I avoid ethnic foods I am 
unfamiliar with. If I do not know what it is supposed to look 
like when it is good, I cannot be certain I will be able to tell 
if tt is bad. 
No matter how careful I am I still get dysentery at least 
once a month, oftener in warm weather. I do not want to 
paint too romantic a picture. Dumpster diving has serious 
drawbacks as a way of life. 
.1 learned to scavenge gradually, on my own. Since then 1 
have initiated several companions into the trade. I have 
learned that there is a predictable series of stages a person 
goes through in learning to scavenge. 
At first the new scavenger is filled with disgust and td£» 
loathing. He is ashamed of being seen and may lurk around, 
trying to duck behind things, or he may try to dive at night. 
(In fact, most people instinctively look away from a scaven-
ger. By skulking around, the novice calls attention to himself 
and arouses suspicion. Diving at night is ineffective and need* 
lessly messy.) 
Every grain of rice seems to be a maggot. Everything seems 
to stink. He can wipe the egg yolk off the found can, but he 
cannot erase from his mind the stigma of eating garbage. 
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That stage passes with experience. The scavenger finds a 
pair of running shoes that fit and look and smell brand-new. 
He finds a pocket calculator in perfect working order. He 
finds pristine ice cream, still frozen, more than he can eat or 
keep. He begins to understand: People throw away perfectly 
good stuff, a lot of perfectly good stuff. 
At this stage, Dumpster shyness begins to dissipate. The 
diver, after all, has the last laugh. He is finding all manner of 
good things that are his for the taking. Those who disparage 
his profession are the fools, not he. 
He may begin to hang on to some perfectly good things 
for which he has neither a use nor a market. Then he begins 
to take note of the things that are not perfectly good but are 
nearly so. He mates a Walkman with broken earphones and-
one that is missing a battery cover. He picks up things that he 
can repair. 
At this stage he may become lost and never recover. 
Dumpsters arc full of things of some potential value to some* 
one and also of things that never have much intrinsic value 
but are interesting. All the Dumpster divers I have known 
come to the point of trying to acquire everything they touch. 
Why not take it, they reason, since it is all free? This is, of 
course, hopeless. Most divers come to realize that they must 
restrict themselves to items of relatively immediate utility. 
But in some cases the diver simply cannot control himself. I 
have met several of these pack-rat types. Their ideas of the 
values of various pieces of junk verge cm the psychotic. Ev-
ery bit of glass may be a diamond, they think, and all that 
glisters, gold. 
I tend to gain Weight when I am scavenging. Partly this is 
because I always find far more pizza and doughnuts than 
water-packed tuna, nonfat yogurt, and fresh vegetables. Also 
I have not developed much faith in the reliability of Dump-
sters as a food source, although it has been proven to me 
many times. I tend to eat as if I have no idea where my next 
meal is coming from. But mostly 1 just hate to see food go to 
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waste and so I eat much more than I should. Something like 
this drives the obsession to collect junk. 
As for collecting objects, I usually restrict myself to col-
lecting one kind of small object at a time, such as pocket 
calculators, sunglasses, or campaign buttons. To live on the 
street I must anticipate my needs to a certain extent: I must 
pick up and save warm bedding I find in August because it 
will not be found in Dumpsters in November. As I have no 
access to health care, I often hoard essential drugs, such as 
antibiotics and antihistamines. (This course can be recom-
mended only to those with some grounding in pharmacol-
ogy. Antibiotics, for example, even when indicated are worse 
than useless if taken in insufficient amounts.) But even if I 
had a home with extensive storage space, 1 could not save 
everything that might be valuable in some contingency. 
I have proprietary feelings about my Dumpsters. As 1 have 
mentioned, it is no accident that I scavenge from ones where 
good finds are common. But my limited experience with 
Dumpsters in other areas suggests to me that even in poorer 
areas, Dumpsters, if attended with sufficient diligence, can be 
made to yield a livelihood. The rich students discard per* 
fectly good kiwifruit; poorer people discard perfectly good 
apples. Slacks and Polo shifts are found in the one place; jeans 
and T-shirts in the other. The population of competitors 
rather than the affluence of die dumpers most affects the 
feasibility of survival by scavenging. The large number of 
competitors is what puts me off the idea of trying to scavenge 
in places like Los Angeles. 
Curiously, I do not mmd my direct competition, other 
Scavengers, so much as I hate the can scroungers. 
People scrounge cans because they have to have a little 
cash. I have tried scrounging cans with an able-bodied com-
panion. Afoot a can scrounger simply cannot make more 
than a few dollars a day. One can extract the necessities of life 
from the Dumpsters directly with far less effort than would 
be required to accumulate the equivalent value in cans. (These 
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observations may not hold in places with container redemp-
tion laws.) 
Can scroungers, then, are people who must have small 
amounts of cash. These are drug addicts and winos, mostly 
the latter because the amounts of cash are so small. Spirits 
and drugs dot like all other commodities, turn up in Dump* 
sters and the scavenger will from time to time have a half 
bottle of a rather good wine with his dinner. But the wino 
cannot survive on these occasional finds; he must have his 
daily dose to stave off the DTs. All the cans he can carry will 
buy about three bottles of Wild Irish Rose. 
I do not begrudge them the cans, but can scroungers tend 
to tear up the Dumpstcrs, mixing the contents and Uttering 
the area. They become so specialized that they can see only 
cans* They cam my contempt by passing up change, canned 
goods, and readily hockable items. 
There are precious few courtesies among scavengers. But 
it is common practice to set aside surplus items: pairs of 
shoes,'clothing, canned goods, and such, A true scavenger 
hates to see good stuff go to waste, and what he cannot use 
he leaves in good condition in plain sight. 
Qui scroungers lay waste to everything in their path and 
will stir one of a pair of good shoes to the bottom of a 
Dumpster, to be lost or ruined in the muck. Can scroungers 
will even go through individual garbage cans, something I 
have never $€tn a scavenger do. 
Individual garbage cans are set out on the public casement 
only on garbage days. On other days going through them 
requires trespassing dose to t dwelling. Going through in-
dividual garbage cans without scattering Utter is almost im-
possible. Litter is likely to reduce the public's tolerance of 
scavenging. Individual cans are simply not as productive as 
Dumpstcrs; people in houses and duplexes do not move so 
often and for some reason do not tend to discard as much 
useful material. Moreover, the time required to go through 
one garbage can that serves ooe household b not much less 
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than the time required to go through a Dumpster that con-
tains the refuse of twenty apartments. 
But my strongest reservation about going through indi-
vidual garbage cans is that this seems to me a very personal 
kind of invasion to which I would object if I were a house-
holder. Although many things in Dumpstcrs are obviously 
meant never to come to light, a Dumpster is somehow lea 
personal. 
I avoid trying to draw conclusions about the people who 
dump in the Dumpstcrs I frequent. 1 think it would be un-
ethical to do so, although I know many people will find the 
idea of scavenger ethics too funny for words. 
Dumpstcrs contain bank statements, correspondence, and 
other documents, just as anyone might expect. But there are 
also less obvious sources of information. Pill bottles, for ex-
ample. The bbels bear the name of the patient, the name of 
the doctor, and the name of the drug. AIDS drugs and anti-
psychotic medicines, to name but two groups, are specific 
and are seldom prescribed for any other disorders. The plas-
tic compacts for birth-control pills usually have complete 
label information. 
Despite all of this sensitive information, I have had only 
one apartment resident object to my going through the 
Dumpster. In that case it turned out the resident was a uni-
versity athlete who was taking bets and who was afraid I 
would turn up his wager slips. 
Occasionally a find tells a story. I once found a small paper 
bag containing some unused condoms, several partial tubes 
of flavored sexual lubricants, a partially used compact of 
birth-control pills, and the torn pieces of a picture of a young 
man. Clearly she was through with him and planning to give 
up sex altogether. 
Dumpster things are often sad—abandoned teddy bears, 
shredded wedding books, despaired-of sales kits. I find many 
pets lying in state in Dumpstcrs. Although I hope to get off 
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the streets so that Lizbeth can have a long and comfortable 
old aget I know this hope is not very realistic So I suppose 
-when her time comes she too will go into a Dumpstcr. I will 
have no better place for her. And after all9 it is fitting, since 
for most of her life her livelihood has come from the Dump-
stcr. When she finds something I think is safe that has been 
spilled from a Dumpstcr, I let her have i t She already knows 
the route around the best ones. I like to think that if she 
survives me she will have a chance of evading the dog catcher 
and of finding her sustenance on the route. 
Silly vanities also come to rest in the Dumpsters. I am a 
rather accomplished necdlcworker.* I get a lot of material 
from the Dumpsters. Evidently sorority girls, hoping to im-
press someone, perhaps themselves, with their mastery of a 
womanly art, buy a lot of cmbtoidcr-by-number kits, work 
a few stitches horribly, and eventually discard the whole 
mess. I pull out their stitches, .turn the canvas over, and work 
an original design. Do not think I refrain from chuckling as 
I make gifts from these kits. 
I find diaries and journals. I have often thought of com-
piling a book of literary found objects. And perhaps I will 
one day. But what I find is hopelessly commonplace and bad 
without being, even unconsciously, camp. College students 
also discard their papers. I am horrified to discover the kind 
of paper that now merits an A in an undergraduate course. I 
am grateful, however, for the number of good books and 
magazines the students throw out. 
In the area I know best I have never discovered vermin m 
the Dumpsters, but there are two kinds of kitty surprise. One 
is alley cats whom I meet as they leap, claws first, out of 
Dumpsters. This is especially thrilling when I have Uzbeth in 
tow. The other kind of kitty surprise b a plastic garbage bag 
filled with some ponderous, amorphous mass. This always 
proves to be used cat litter. 
City bees harvest doughnut glaze and this makes the 
Dumpstcr at the doughnut shop more interesting. My faith 
in the instinctive wisdom of animals is 11 ways shaken when-
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ever I see Lizbeth attempt to catch a bee in her mouth, which 
she does whenever bees are present. Evidently some birds 
find Dumpsters profitable, for birdie surprise is almost as 
common as kitty surprise of the first kind. In hunting season 
all kinds of small game turn up in Dumpsters, some of it, 
sadly, not entirely dead. Curiously, summer and winter, 
maggots are uncommon. 
The worst of the living and near-living hazards of the 
Dumpsters are the fire ants. The food they claim is not much 
of a loss, but they are vicious and aggressive. It is very easy 
to brush against some surface of the Dumpstcr and pick up 
half a dozen or more fire ants, usually in some sensitive area 
such as the underarm. One advantage of bringing Lizbeth 
along as I make Dumpstcr rounds b that, for obvious rea-
sons, she b very alert to ground-based fire ants. When Uz-
beth recognizes a fire-ant infestation around our feet, she 
does the Dance of the Zillion Fire Ants. I have learned not to 
ignore this warning from Uzbeth, whether I perceive the tiny 
ants or not, but to remove ourselves at Lizbeth's first pas de 
bourse. All the more so because the ants are the worst in the 
summer months when I wear flip-flops if I have them. (Per-
haps someone will misunderstand thb.. Lizbeth does the 
Dance of the Zillion Fire Ants when she recognizes more fire 
ants than she cares to eat, not when she b being bitten. Since 
I have learned to react promptly, she does not get bitten at 
all. It b the isolated patrol of fire ants that falls in Lizbeth** 
range that deserves pity. She finds them quite tasty.) 
By far the best way to go through a Dumpstcr b to lower 
yourself into it. Most of the good stuff tends to settle at the 
bottom because it b usually weightier than the rubbish* My 
more athletic companions have often demonstrated to me 
that they can extract much good material from a Dumpstcr I 
have already been over. 
To those psychologically of physically unprepared to enter 
a Dumpstcr, I recommend a stout stick, preferably with some 
barb or hook at one end. The hook can be used to grab plastic 
garbage bags. When I find canned goods or other objects 
124 — — — — Imr* EigAmtr 
loose at the bottom of a Duutpstet
 11 lower a bag into it, toll 
the desired object into the bag, and then hoist the bag out—a 
procedure more easily described than executed. Much 
Dutnpster diving is a matter of experience for which nothing 
will do except practice. 
Dutnpster diving if outdoor work, often surprisingly 
pleasant. It is not entirely predictable; things of interest turn 
up every day and some days there are finds of great value. I 
am always very pleased when I can turn up exactly the thing 
I most wanted to find* Yet in spite of the element of chance, 
scavenging more than most other pursuits tends to yield re-, 
turns in some proportion to the effort and intelligence 
brought to bear. It is very sweet to turn up a few dollars in 
change from i Dutnpster that has just been gone over by a 
wino. 
The land is now coveted with cities. The cities are full of 
Dumpsters. If a member of the canine race is ever able to 
know what it is doing, then Lizbeth knows that when we go 
around to the Dumpsters, we are hunting. I think of scav-
enging ** * modem form of self-reliance. In any event, after 
having survived nearly ten years of government service, 
where everything is geared to the lowest common denomi-
nator, I find it refreshing to have work that rewards initiative 
and effort. Certainly I would be happy to have a sinecure 
again, but I am no longer heartbroken that I left one. 
I find from the experience of scavenging two rather deep 
lessons. The first is to take what you can use and let the rest 
go by. I have come to think that there is no value in the 
abstract. A thing I cannot use or make useful, perhaps by 
trading, has no value however rare or fine it may be. I mean 
useful in a broad sense—some art I would find useful and 
some otherwise. 
I was shocked to realize that some things are not worth 
acquiring, but now I think it is so. Some material things are 
white elephants that eat up the possessor's substance. The 
second lesson b the transience of material being. This has not 
quite converted me to a dualist, but it has made some head-
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*»ay in that dircctkm. I do not suppose ttut ideas ate faunae-
tal, but certainly mental things are longer lived than other 
material things. 
Once I was the sort of person who invests objects with 
sentimental value. Now I no longer have those objects, but I 
have the sentiments yet. 
Many times in our travels I have lost everything but the 
clothes I was wearing and Lizbeth. The things I find in 
Dumpsters, the love letters and rag dolls of so many lives, 
remind me of this lesson. Now I hardly pick up a thing 
without envisioning the time I will east it aside. This I think 
is a healthy state of mind. Almost everything I have now has 
already been cast out at least once, proving that what I own 
' b valueless to someone. 
Anyway, I find my desire to grab for the gaudy bauble has 
been largely sated. I think this is an attitude I share with the 
very wealthy—-we both know there is plenty more where 
what we have came from. Between us are the rat-race mil* 
lions who nightly scavenge the cable channels looking for 
they know not what. 
I am sorry for them. 
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